Louisiana Tech University

Louisiana Tech Digital Commons
Doctoral Dissertations

Graduate School

Fall 1997

Does the going concern explanatory paragraph
have information content as perceived by bank loan
officers?
Rafik Zakaria Elias

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.latech.edu/dissertations
Recommended Citation
Elias, Rafik Zakaria, "" (1997). Dissertation. 730.
https://digitalcommons.latech.edu/dissertations/730

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at Louisiana Tech Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Louisiana Tech Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
digitalcommons@latech.edu.

j

INFORMATION TO USERS

This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI
films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some
thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter free, while others may be
from any type o f computer printer.
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the
copy subm itted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality
illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins,
and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete
manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted.

Also, if

unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate
the deletion.
Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by
sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand comer and
continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. Each
original is also photographed in one exposure and is included in reduced
form at the back of the book.
Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced
xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6” x 9” black and white
photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations
appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to
order.

UMI
A Bell & Howell Information Company
300 North Zed) Road, Ann Arbor MI 48106-1346 USA
313/761-4700 800/521-0600

R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

DOES THE GOING CONCERN EXPLANATORY PARAGRAPH
HAVE INFORMATION CONTENT AS PERCEIVED
BY BANK LOAN OFFICERS?

by

Rafik Z. Elias, B.S., M.S., C.P.A

A Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment
for the Degree
Doctor of Business Administration

LOUISIANA TECH UNIVERSITY
COLLEGE OF ADMINISTRATION AND BUSINESS
November 1997

i
R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission.

UMI Number: 9812173

UMI Microform 9812173
Copyright 1998, by UMI Company. All rights reserved.
This microform edition is protected against unauthorized
copying under Title 17, United States Code.

UMI

300 North Zeeb Road
Ann Arbor, MI 48103

R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission.

LOUISIANA TECH UNIVERSITY
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
November 20. 1997
Date

We hereby recommend that the dissertation prepared under our supervision
by_____________________ Rafik Zakaria Elias____________________________
entitled

Does the Going Concern Explanatory Paragraph Have_____________

_________ Information Content as Perceived bv Bank Loan Officers?___________

be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for

the Degree o f

D octor o f Business A dm inistration

/l L A &

upervisor of Dis citation Research

Recommendation concurred in:

Advisory Committee

Approved:
Director of Graduate Studies

Dean of Graduate School

Deanjof the College
GS Form 13
8/96

R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission.

ABSTRACT

Reporting going concern uncertainty has always been a controversial
issue for standard-setters, auditors, and users of the financial statements.
Current standards require the auditor to include an explanatory paragraph in
an unqualified audit opinion to report going concern uncertainty. This research
investigated the information content attributed to this additional paragraph as
viewed by users.
Two groups of commercial loan officers were presented with the same
information for an actual case company exhibiting going concern uncertainty.
One group received a modified report and a footnote disclosure of the going
concern situation while the other group received an unqualified report and the
footnote disclosure. Both groups were asked to indicate the likelihood that a
line of credit would be granted to this company, provide an estimate of the
interest rate, indicate their confidence in their decision, and indicate their
perception of this company’s potential bankruptcy. A seven-point Likert scale
was used.
Parametric and nonparametric tests were applied to the data. The
results did not find both groups’ answers on any of the Likert scales or the
interest rate estimate to be statistically different based on a modified report

iii
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and a footnote disclosure compared to an unqualified report and a footnote
disclosure. This study, therefore, showed that the explanatory paragraph for
going concern uncertainty did not have information content. With the
elimination of the explanatory paragraph requirement for other uncertainties,
serious consideration should be given to eliminating this requirement for going
concern uncertainty as well.

iv
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Financial statements of business enterprises must conform with
prescribed standards known as Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
(GAAP). GAAP consists of certain rules and assumptions. One important
assumption--that of the going concem -has received considerable attention and
caused much controversy in recent years. Under this assumption, a business
enterprise will continue indefinitely, or at least long enough to fulfill its
objectives. A violation of this assumption can have a serious impact on
financial statements. For example, it justifies the depreciation of long-term
assets. Disregard for this assumption would justify charging assets as expenses
in the period acquired. The going concern assumption also justifies the
classification of some assets and liabilities as long-term. Without the enterprise
continuity assumption, the liquidation basis of accounting would be appropriate.
In addition to its importance in the formulation of GAAP, the going
concern assumption bears crucially on audits. The auditor issues an opinion
stating that the financial statements are "in conformity with Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles." If preparers have not followed GAAP, the auditor must
issue a qualified or adverse opinion. Therefore, the auditing profession has
1
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focused its attention on the going concern issue. Past discussions of the going
concern concept and the resulting standards have had two major objectives.
They have sought to establish guidelines for the auditor in determining
compliance with (or departure from) the going concern assumption, and they
have attem pted to determine the best way for communicating non-compliance
information to users.

Importance of Studying the
Going Concern Issue
The going concern issue affects several parties: the companies,
auditor(s), and users of the financial statements. Companies care about their
financial health and their continuity, as well as their image in the industry and
the potential negative impact of a deteriorating financial situation. Auditors
have responsibilities to users who rely upon their reports. Users should only
depend upon auditors to assure them that financial statements have been
prepared in accordance with GAAP.
Users of the financial statements, especially investors and creditors, have
critical interests in each company’s viability for investment. The going concern
assumption underlies the calculation of the required rate of return on
investment during a particular period of time. Creditors, such as bankers, also
have an interest in the company’s continuity and its ability to repay loans and
interest. Even though creditors have a priority in case of bankruptcy, they must
consider the opportunity cost of making a loan to another company. Therefore,

A
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during the audit, the auditor must consider the going concern issue and its
possible implications on all parties involved.

Need for Additional Research
on Going Concern

In 1988, the Auditing Standards Board (ASB) issued Statement of
Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 59: "The Auditor’s Consideration of an Entity’s
Ability to Continue as a Going Concern." The ASB’s chairman described this
standard as "the most controversial of the numerous projects on which the ASB
worked during 1986 to 1988" (Guy and Sullivan 1988, 43). The controversy
arose because many companies had experienced bankruptcy shortly after
receiving an unqualified opinion from their auditors. This created an
expectation gap between users and auditors.
In an effort to address the expectation gap, SAS No. 59 required
auditors to specifically consider the going concern issue in every audit. This
standard imposed substantially more responsibility on the auditors than had its
predecessor, SAS No. 34: "The Auditor’s Considerations When a Question
Arises about an Entity’s Continued Existence." That standard had required
auditors to consider going concern uncertainty only if they discovered contrary
information during audits. In those cases, they would issue "subject to"
qualified opinions. SAS No. 59 provided for the issuance of unqualified
opinions, but still required that the auditor’s report contain an explanatory
paragraph describing the going concern doubt.

j
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Substantially less research has examined the explanatory paragraph
requirement than the "subject to" requirement. This lack of research has
continued even though explanatory paragraphs arguably have retained certain
"red flag" features (Kaplan and Pany 1992). In their study of comment letters
on SAS No. 59’s exposure draft, Kaplan and Pany found considerable user
support for this standard. However, responses indicated a difference of opinion
among "Big Six" firms as well as among smaller firms.
Empirical evidence concerning the frequency of issuing going concern
opinions after SAS No. 59 showed the need for additional study. According to
Carsello, Hermanson, and Huss (1995), auditors did not tend to issue going
concern modified reports after SAS No. 59 became effective. On the other
hand, Raghunandan and Rama (1995) provided different results showing
auditors issuing more modified reports after SAS No. 59 took effect. These
conflicting results showed the need for additional study of the impact of SAS
No. 59 on interested parties.
Timing has also added importance to this study. During 1988, the ASB
issued SAS No. 58: "Reports on Audited Financial Statements." This standard
required each auditor to modify his report using an explanatory paragraph
highlighting any uncertainties (other than going concern) facing the company.
However, in December 1995, SAS No. 79 amended SAS No. 58, and it
eliminated the explanatory paragraph requirement. SAS No. 79, however, did
not amend SAS No. 59 regarding the use of an explanatory paragraph for a

i
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going concern issue. The issuance of a special standard dealing with going
concern uncertainty, as well as the refusal to change it later, indicated the
importance of this problem and the m ethod of reporting it.

Purpose of the Study
The primary purpose of this study has been to examine the usefulness of
the explanatory paragraph concerning going concern uncertainty to users of the
financial statements. The elimination of explanatory paragraphs for other
uncertainties has created the need for a prescriptive study to determine the
appropriate treatm ent of explanatory paragraphs for going concern
uncertainties. This project selected financial statement users for its study
group; the ASB had targeted them in its standard-setting process, and they had
provided the most input to SAS No. 59’s exposure draft.
Secondary objectives included gaining insight into users’ reaction to
financial statements of companies exhibiting going concern problems. The
study also examined the impact of the explanatory paragraph on users’
confidence and whether such a paragraph increased the perception of
bankruptcy.

Statement of the Problem
The APB has mandated use of an explanatory paragraph (when
applicable) for going concern uncertainty in audit reports. However, the
accounting profession has not yet developed a consensus about the information
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content of the explanatory paragraph. This study has addressed the problem of
determining the information content of the explanatory paragraph. In
particular, it has attempted to determine whether the explanatory paragraph
has provided user information in addition to that not conveyed through
footnote disclosures. This study has also sought to measure the "side effects" of
the modified report on the lending decision, and it has attempted to determine
whether going concern disclosures increased the perception of bankruptcy.

Research Design

In the interest of realism, the experiment for this study used Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) Form 10-K report data from a company that
actually received a going concern modified report.

Data and Sample Selection

The participant sample for this experiment consisted of loan officers in
different banks across the United States. Those bankers had experience in
reviewing loan applications from businesses similar to the company selected.
The study utilized a mail questionnaire.

The Experiment

Data for this study included a selected company’s financial statements,
as well as the audit report and the footnote explaining going concern
uncertainty. The participant sample was divided into two groups. The first
group evaluated an unqualified audit report with the explanatory paragraph

il
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(i.e., a "modified" report), as well as the footnote; the other group evaluated an
unqualified audit report with no explanatory paragraph, as well as the footnote.
Each participant was asked to estimate the likelihood that his bank
would grant a specified line of credit, as well as what interest rate the bank
would charge. The study attributed risk perception differences—between
groups, but for the same company~to the information content of the
explanatory paragraph.

Expected Contribution of the Study
This study has investigated some possible effects of eliminating the
explanatory paragraph requirement for reporting going concern uncertainty.
For other uncertainties, the APB had reasoned that footnote disclosures
provided a sufficient explanation that made the explanatory paragraph
unnecessary. This prescriptive research should shed light on the usefullness of
an explanatory paragraph regarding going concern uncertainties by focusing on
an important segment of audit report users. Also, it should shed light on
bankers’ perception of going concern uncertainty.

Dissertation Outline
Following this introduction, Chapter 2 presents a literature review
detailing the profession’s struggle with the going concern problem and the
appropriate method for reporting it. It reviews several studies explaining the
consequences of going concern warnings, as well as studies of capital markets

i
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and studies investigating the information content of these warnings. Chapter 3
describes the research methodology, sample selection, and data gathering
techniques employed in this study. Chapter 4 presents analyses of the data
obtained from the experiment. Chapter 5 discusses the findings and their
policy implications. The Appendices present the case, the questionnaire and a
sample of respondents’ comments.

ii
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CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter presents a review of the auditing profession’s attem pt to
deal with the going concern issue through commissions and standards. It
initially examines early efforts that dealt with the issue of uncertainties in
general (such as SAP Nos. 15 and 33 and SAS Nos. 58 and 79), and going
concern uncertainties in particular (such as SAS Nos. 34 and 59). It then
reviews empirical studies examining the consequences of qualified opinions on
companies and auditors. The next section reviews capital m arket studies
dealing with the information content of qualified opinions, especially those
qualified due to uncertainties and going concern issues. That section examines
studies using pre- and post-SAS No. 59 language. The final part of this chapter
reviews experimental studies that have examined the information content of
qualified opinions and reports modified due to uncertainties.

Early Efforts bv the Auditing Profession

Statement on Auditing Procedure (SAP) No. 15 (in 1942) addressed the
effect of uncertainties in general, including going concern uncertainty, on the
audit report. The statement suggested that the cumulative effect of

9
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uncertainties could require modification of the standard audit report and could
make the auditor unable to render an opinion. SAP No. 33 (in 1963) required
that audit reports modified due to material uncertainties-including going
concern uncertainty-contain the qualifying words "subject to."

Commission on Auditors’
Responsibilities

The requirement to issue a "subject to" opinion triggered debate and
controversy on the appropriate way to report uncertainties. In 1974, the
Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities (CAR)-also known as the Cohen
Commission—was formed to determine the appropriate level of auditors’
responsibilities regarding uncertainties. In 1978, the CAR recommended
elimination of "subject to" opinions. The commission had deem ed these
opinions deficient in several respects. First, the commission believed that SAP
No. 33 unreasonably required the auditor to serve as a reporter and interpreter
of financial information when reporting on uncertainties. In addition, the
auditor was in no better position than users to predict the outcome of the
uncertainty. Second, the "subject to" opinion may have confused users by
creating the false impression that preparers would restate the financial
statements upon resolution of the uncertainty. Third, the commission believed
that SAP No. 33 may have created false expectations that unqualified opinions
meant no uncertainties. In the Commission’s view, "All companies, however,
face a variety of economic risks." Fourth, the requirement to qualify could

i!
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cause the auditor to overlook the appropriateness of the footnote disclosure.
The CAR recommended that the auditor not attempt to reduce uncertainty by
predicting the outcome of future events. The Commission acknowledged users’
needs for a warning signal, but it noted that users should not view going
concern qualifications as a prediction of bankruptcy. The CAR also
acknowledged the "self-fulfilling prophecy" feature of the going concern
qualification when it noted, "Creditors often regard a ’subject to’ qualification
as a separate reason for not granting a loan." The CAR concluded overall that
the auditor should appropriately disclose all uncertainties, including going
concern issues, in the footnotes.
The Commission’s recommendations regarding uncertainties faced strong
opposition from users. Several studies sought to determine investors’ and
bankers’ preference for reporting uncertainties.
Shank, Dillard, and Murdock (1978) presented senior loan officers with
the option to choose the method through which auditors should communicate
uncertainty and their perception of the way in which auditors would
communicate. The options consisted of (1) no reference to the situation,
(2) disclosure only in the unaudited section of the annual report, (3) disclosure
in a footnote, (4) disclosure plus a "subject to" opinion, and (5) disclaimer of
opinion. The officers reviewed eight cases involving contingencies, including
going concern difficulties. Most officers indicated that for all contingencies the
auditor should issue a qualified opinion. They had an even higher preference
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for going concern uncertainty. Only 38% correctly predicted how the auditor
would report the contingency. The bankers also noted that qualified opinions
provided a better defense for the auditor in case of an unfavorably resolved
contingency.
In another study, Shank, Dillard, and Bylinski (1979) surveyed investors
to determine their reporting preferences regarding uncertainties. They
presented eight cases and gave investors the following options: (1) no specific
reference to the situation, (2) disclosure only in the unaudited section of the
annual report, (3) disclosure in a footnote to the financial statements,
(4) disclosure in the footnotes plus a "subject to" audit report, and
(5) disclaimer of opinion. Similar to the bankers’ study, investors expressed
preference for the "subject to" audit report. Most investors noted that the
auditor should report contingencies through a qualified opinion and a footnote
disclosure, especially for going concern problems.
These studies indicated investor and banker opposition to the CAR’s
recommendation to eliminate the qualified opinion. Bankers argued that
qualified opinions served useful purpose in decision making. The ASB
considered the Committee’s recommendation. In fact, the ASB came close to
implementing it in 1982, with SEC concurrence. However, according to Asare
(1990), in a public meeting to discuss the exposure draft, users voiced strong
opposition that lawmakers later supported, and the ASB never implemented
the standard.

J
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SAS No. 34

In 1981, the ASB issued SAS No. 34 dealing specifically with the going
concern issue. The standard did not impose a responsibility on auditors to
evaluate the company’s going concern status unless they discovered contrary
information during the audit. The auditor’s responsibility did not extend
beyond the consideration of asset recoverability and liability classification. If
auditors had doubt about the entity’s continued existence, the new standard
required that they should consider mitigating factors and the effect of this
doubt on the financial statements. SAS No. 34 required them to issue a
qualified "subject to" opinion if they questioned the recoverability of assets and
classification of liabilities.
The level of responsibility indicated by SAS No. 34 proved inadequate
for lawmakers and users. They noted that many businesses (such as United
American Bank and Penn Square Bank) had failed shortly after receiving an
unqualified audit opinion. Because SAS No. 34 did not fulfill users’ wishes, an
expectation gap developed.

The Expectation Gap

Practitioners acknowledged an expectation gap but could develop no
consensus supporting additional auditor responsibilities. Elliott and Jacobson
(1987) argued that auditors could not provide an effective warning signal for
bankruptcy because no one could. They argued
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The underlying question is not whether auditors should be providing
early-warning information in audit reports but whether users are receiving
sufficient audited financial information to assist them in reaching
conclusions on the future prospects of business entities. (Emphasis
added)
The authors implied limited auditor responsibility. Auditors should only
present financial information to permit users to make decisions.
Campbell and Mutchler (1988) compared auditors’ and bankers’
perceptions of the going concern audit opinion. Auditors indicated that they
issued a going concern opinion because of likely failure and that the value of
the assets reported in the financial statement did not indicate recoverable
value. Surprisingly, 39% of the auditors indicated the need for a going concern
opinion in the event of probable failure. Additionally they thought the auditor
should provide a signal to financial statement users. In interpreting these
findings, the authors argued that many of the auditors responded with what
they thought they should do.
Most bankers chose the option that auditors did have the responsibility
for signaling going concern doubt. Both groups deemed the opinion im portant
and useful. The authors concluded that the ASB could eliminate the
expectation gap with no difficulty. These results prompted the ASB to consider
issuing a statement that would satisfy users by retaining the early warning signal
while eliminating the "subject to" qualification.

ii
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SAS No. 58

In 1988, the Accounting Standards Board issued a number of
"expectation gap standards." SAS No. 58 dealt with uncertainties in general,
and SAS No. 59 dealt specifically with going concern uncertainty.
SAS No. 58 defined an uncertainty as
A matter . . . that is expected to be resolved at a future date, at which
time sufficient evidential m atter concerning its outcome would be
expected to become available.
For example, the auditors for a defendant in a lawsuit with an uncertain
outcome on the balance sheet date would have to consider the adequacy of the
footnote disclosure regarding this uncertainty. If the auditors considered the
disclosure inadequate, they would have to add an explanatory paragraph to the
unqualified opinion emphasizing the uncertainty and referring the user to the
appropriate footnote. This type of opinion became known as "the modified
report." The standard did not specify the language of the explanatory
paragraph. Inadequate footnote disclosures would constitute a departure from
GAAP, and require a qualified or adverse opinion.
SAS No. 58 effectively eliminated "subject to" opinions and replaced
them with modified reports that retained the warning signals. It appeared that
the ASB believed in the CAR’s recommendation that the words "subject to"
confused users. However, the ASB continued to require early warnings, and it
shifted its emphasis to how to report uncertainties in the audit report, not
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whether to report them. The ASB, therefore, partially implemented the Cohen
Commission’s recommendations.
The ASB felt that uncertainties fell into different categories. One
category of uncertainties related to litigation and other situations involving
losses, while a second, more serious, category related to going concern issues.
The board clarified its apparent classification of uncertainties when it issued a
special statement dealing with going concern uncertainties.

SAS No. 59

SAS No. 59, issued in 1988 and effective in 1989, substantially changed
the way auditors considered and reported going concern problems. For
example, SAS No. 59 specifically required the auditor to consider the going
concern assumption in every audit. SAS No. 59 focused, not on the
recoverability of assets or the classification of liabilities, but rather on the going
concern assumption. SAS No. 59 imposed an affirmative duty on the auditor,
compared to a negative duty under SAS No. 34. SAS No. 59 offered several
guidelines for the auditor in dealing with the going concern issue. For
example, the standard listed negative trends--such as working capital
deficiencies and negative cash flows--as factors raising substantial doubt about
the entity’s ability to continue as a going concern. Other factors included
internal matters (such as work stoppages or labor problems), significant need to
revise operations, and external matters (such as legislation changes or losses of
key franchises or patents).

R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission.

17

If the auditor discovered such factors during the audit, it would justify
doubt about the entity’s going concern assumption. If there were substantial
doubt about the entity’s ability to continue as a going concern for a period not
to exceed one year from the date of the financial statements, the auditor would
have to consider management’s plans to mitigate the problem. Management’s
plans may include disposition of assets, additional borrowing, an d /o r
restructuring. In considering management’s plans, the auditor would have to
consider positive and negative factors in the implementation of these plans.
Adequate management plans, along with complete disclosures, would make
report modification unnecessary.
If, after reviewing management plans, there were still substantial doubt,
the auditor would have to consider the completeness of the disclosures and
could issue a modified report. That report would contain an explanatory
paragraph, and an unqualified opinion, if appropriate. Incomplete and
insufficient disclosures would constitute a departure from GAAP, and the
auditor would issue a qualified or adverse opinion. The ASB left most of the
language of the explanatory paragraph to the auditor’s discretion. The ASB
required that the auditor would mention the condition(s) giving rise to
substantial doubt and would refer the reader to the appropriate footnote. The
standard also required the use of the phrase "substantial doubt about its (the
entity’s) ability to continue as a going concern."
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SAS No. 59, however, allowed the auditor to issue either a modified
report or a disclaimer of opinion. The standard did not provide the auditor
with specific guidance in choosing the type of report. LaSalle, Anandarajan
and Miller (1996) examined some of the factors that influenced the auditor in
determining the type of report to issue. They surveyed 183 partners in CPA
firms. Modified reports were sent to 130 partners and disclaimers of opinion
were sent to 53 partners. The questions presented the partners with 51 items
representing good news and bad news about a company and potential legal
liability. The respondents were asked to assess the extent to which each factor
was present in a client of their choice that received a going concern report.
This survey, therefore, provided confidential information about 183 companies
experiencing going concern difficulty. The respondents’ perception of the
importance of each factor in deciding which report to issue was measured on a
1 to 5 scale. The results showed that companies that received a disclaimer of
opinion were more likely to have more bad news items, fewer good news items
and weaker internal control. The results also showed that auditors who
believed the going concern audit report offered protection from lawsuits were
more likely to issue a disclaimer of opinion if the probability of a lawsuit was
high.
In an attempt to analyze SAS No. 59, Ellingsen, Pany, and Fagan (1989)
noted that although the standard required the auditors to evaluate going
concern, they had no responsibility for predicting future events. They
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compared an audit to an annual physical examination, whereby the doctor dealt
with existing conditions as of the date of the examination and not with
subsequent conditions. The doctor in this case had no responsibility for future
events, and the patient could not hold the doctor accountable for such events.
In issuing SAS No. 59, the ASB implemented some of the CAR’s
recommendation. The ASB considered "subject to" opinions misleading and
eliminated them. On the other hand, the board did not believe the CAR’s
recommendation that auditors could not assess viability as a going concern.
Therefore, it retained the warning signal previously conveyed by "subject to"
opinions by adding the explanatory paragraph. The standard focused on how to
communicate going concern uncertainties, not on whether to communicate
them.
The issuance of SAS Nos. 58 and 59 was an attempt to close the
expectation gap by requiring auditors to communicate uncertainties to users to
help them in their decision making. However, the question of report
redundancy resurfaced during attempts to measure appropriate ways of
communicating these uncertainties.

SAS No. 79
In December 1995, the ASB issued SAS No. 79: "Amendment to
Statement on Auditing Standards No. 58, ’Reports on Audited Financial
Statements.’" SAS No. 79 no longer required the auditor to use an explanatory
paragraph to report certain uncertainties. Under the new standard, auditors
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had the option of including an explanatory paragraph if they desired to do so.
However, SAS No. 79 did not affect going concern reporting. It still required
an explanatory paragraph for going concern uncertainties.
Birdzell (1996) analyzed the reasons for amending SAS No. 58. He
noted that many users believed that the uncertainties paragraph communicated
information not disclosed in the footnotes. Contrary to the ASB’s intention,
some users viewed the absence of the explanatory paragraph as indicating no
uncertainties, and this impression discouraged them from reading the footnotes.
The standards board noted that users required explanatory paragraphs based
on concerns about the adequacy of footnote disclosures. Statement of Position
(SOP) 94-6: "Disclosure of Certain Significant Risks and Uncertainties"
required additional disclosures in the footnotes. This addressed users’ concerns
about disclosure adequacy, and it rendered the explanatory paragraph no
longer necessary.
By issuing SAS No. 79, the ASB implemented another recommendation
of the CAR. The board believed that explanatory paragraphs, for most
uncertainties, contained no information beyond that in the footnotes, and that
auditors should avoid them. The board, however, did not hold the same belief
for going concern uncertainties.

Consequences of Qualified Opinions

Several studies have investigated the different consequences of qualified
reports, especially those qualified or modified for uncertainties. The decision
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to issue a qualified opinion certainly involved extensive discussion between the
auditors and the company due to the potential signaling effect of this opinion.
Such signaling may have induced auditor switching and the potential selffulfilling prophecy effect. From the auditors’ perspective, qualified opinions
may have provided liability protection in case of a lawsuit. This section reviews
related research in this area.

Auditor Changes

Chow and Rice (1982) provided early evidence that companies tended to
switch auditors after receiving qualified opinions. They examined a total of
10,000 firms for the years 1973 and 1974. They classified firms into four
categories: (1) those companies changing auditors after receiving a qualified
opinion, (2) those companies keeping the same auditors after receiving a
qualified opinion, (3) those companies changing auditors after receiving a clean
opinion, and (4) those keeping the same auditors after receiving a clean
opinion. Comparison tests indicated that companies tended to change auditors
more frequently after receiving a qualified opinion. This result remained true
after controlling for other factors leading to auditor changes. The authors also
found that auditors differed in their tendency to issue qualified opinions.
In a similar study, Schwartz and Menon (1985) found no evidence of
auditor switching. They examined a sample of only 131 failed firms, but they
tested a larger time frame, from 1974 to 1982. They selected a control group
by matching every bankrupt company with a non-bankrupt company in the
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same industry. The study classified distressed companies that made auditor
changes in the three-year period before bankruptcy as "switchers" and those
that did not switch during the same period as "non-switchers." Comparison tests
indicated no evidence of auditor switching after receiving qualified opinions.
Craswell (1988) examined the issue of qualified opinions and auditor
switching in Australia. He reviewed about 33,000 annual reports of companies
listed on the Sydney Stock Exchange from 1950 to 1979. Craswell considered
only first-time qualifications, and he identified changes of auditors as those
occurring any time within five years after the qualification. This time frame
was differed from the one-year time frames used by Chow and Rice (1982) and
Schwartz and Menon (1985). Craswell established two qualification
classifications. "Serious" qualifications consisted of disclaimers, adverse
opinions, and multiple reasons for qualification. "Minor" qualifications
concerned technical accounting differences. His results indicated that
companies tended to change auditors more frequently after receiving
qualifications, especially "serious" qualifications.
The previous studies provided mixed results. However, use of different
methodologies preclude direct comparisons of results. For example, the time
frame used by Chow and Rice (1982) and Schwartz and Menon (1985) differed
from the one used by Craswell (1988). Difficulties arose in attempts to
compare Chow and Rice (1982) with Schwartz and Menon (1985) because the
latter study used only failed firms and a different time period. In addition,
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Craswell examined only Australian firms. Therefore, the evidence on auditor
switching after qualified opinions is inconclusive.

Company Failures

Williams (1984) interviewed 15 partners in large accounting firms about
their impressions of the going concern opinion and its consequences. The
partners indicated that they considered several factors when issuing a going
concern opinion. The interviewers also sought opinions about the self-fulfilling
prophecy of the going concern opinion. This prophecy stipulates that if the
audit report refers to the going concern uncertainty, this referral, by itself,
rather than the company’s actual condition will cause the company to fail. The
partners had different opinions about the self-fulfilling prophecy, but most of
them said it did not affect their decision. Those partners rejecting the selffulfilling prophecy noted that investors had enough sophistication to rely on
additional sources.
Garsombke and Choi (1992) examined the association between
uncertainty reporting and company failures in the 1981 to 1985 time period.
Their sample consisted of surviving firms receiving clean opinions, "subject to"
going concern qualifications, and going concern disclaimers. They matched and
compared those firms with failed firms in order to determine the failure rates
of firms with differing audit opinions. The results indicated that (1) firms with
"subject to" going concern opinions had higher failure rates than firms receiving
going concern disclaimers, and (2) firms with “subject to" going concern
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opinions had higher failure rates than firms with clean opinions. These results
indicated that going concern opinions had information content in predicting
bankruptcy.
Louwers, Messina, and Richard (1996) also investigated the self-fulfilling
prophecy of going concern opinions by examining the aftermath of 231 firsttime going concern modifications on the clients' subsequent existence. They
studied the 1984 to 1991 time period. The results showed that a significantly
high percentage of firms survived their first time going concern qualifications.
The authors concluded that these warnings had little importance in determining
clients' survival.
These two empirical studies provided mixed evidence on the selffulfilling prophecy and revealed a controversy that first appeared in Williams
(1984). Garsombke and Choi (1992) supported the self-fulfilling prophecy;
Louwers, Messina, and Richard (1996) did not. Different methodologies and
different time periods mitigated against direct result comparisons.

Other Consequences

In many instances, qualified opinions had an impact on auditor
switching, the self-fulfilling prophecy, and other less-researched consequences.
Whittred (1980) examined audit report issuance delays in Australia due to
report modifications. He classified modified reports into three groups:
(l)qualified opinions, (2) adverse opinions, and (3) disclaimers. His study
sample addressed first time modifications only. He identified a ten-year test
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period (1965-74), and he tested the delay over two periods (between year-end
and report date, and between report date and filing with the Sydney Stock
Exchange). The results indicated the following: (1) that first time modifications
delayed the release of audit reports and annual reports, and (2) that more
serious modifications resulted in longer delays. Whittred attributed the delays
to increased negotiation between the auditors and management in light of
negative impacts. Elliott (1982) found similar results in the U.S.
Holt and Moizer (1990) investigated the meaning of different audit
reports to auditors and users in the U.K. Users included bankers and
stockbrokers. The audit reports ranged from unqualified opinions to scope
limitations to going concern qualifications. Participants answered 13 questions
about matters ranging from reliability and usefulness of financial statements to
responsibility of auditors. The results indicated that, for going concern
uncertainties, and for all 13 dimensions, users felt generally less confident
about the financial statements than did the auditors. The authors concluded
that auditors should understand the increased uncertainty caused by this report
type.
Abbott (1994) interviewed audit managers and partners in large CPA
firms regarding their impression of the going concern opinion. The subjects
mentioned that SAS No. 59 and the litigation environment increased the CPA
firms’ documentation requirements, and those factors increased the number of
partners involved in the audit. However, the partners and managers noted that
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adding an explanatory paragraph did not protect the auditor from a lawsuit,
despite the intentions behind SAS No. 59.
Carsello and Palmrose (1994) investigated lawsuit protection related to
bankruptcy caused by allegedly inadequate warning signals. Their sample
consisted of 655 public companies that declared bankruptcy between 1972 and
1992. They compared audit reports before bankruptcy among three groups of
firms: (1) those with auditor litigation, (2) those with other litigation, and (3)
those with no litigation. The results showed relatively greater numbers of
modified audit reports for companies with no litigation; additionally, the results
showed that lawsuits for companies receiving modified reports had the highest
dismissal rate and the lowest payments in cases of adverse lawsuit outcome.
The authors concluded that modified audit reports tended to weaken plaintiffs’
claims against auditors.
The previous three experimental studies revealed several consequences
of qualified and modified reports, especially those due to going concern
problems. For example, qualified opinions caused delays in releases of audit
reports. Qualified opinions also tended to reduce users’ confidence in the
financial statements. Empirical evidence showed modified reports due to going
concern uncertainty protected auditors from lawsuits even though practitioners
did not agree with this viewpoint.
Citron and Taffler (1992) investigated several consequences of qualified
opinions in the U.K. During the period 1977 to 1986, only 26% of failing
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companies received qualified opinions before bankruptcy. The results revealed
a relationship between the likelihood of a company’s failure and the probability
of going concern modification. The results also showed that companies with a
going concern qualification exhibited a significantly higher rate of auditor
switching and that most of the companies receiving going concern modifications
survived. The auditor switching results agreed with Chow and Rice’s (1982)
results, but the survival results differed from those of Garsombke and Choi
(1992).

Impact of SAS No. 59
Several studies attempted to isolate the effect of SAS No. 59 on auditors
propensity to issue going concern modified reports. For example, many studies
attem pted to determine whether SAS No. 59 caused auditors to evaluate going
concern issues more thoroughly and issue modified reports in more audits.
Other studies investigated whether more bankrupt companies had received
going concern opinions.
Johnson and Khurana (1995) selected a sample of 185 companies filing
bankruptcy between 1986 and 1992. The sample excluded companies with
fiscal years ending during the transition period between SAS No. 59 issuance
(1988) and the effective date (January 1, 1989). Comparison of the number of
filings during the time periods under SAS No. 34 and SAS No. 59 revealed that
a larger proportion of bankrupt companies had received modified reports after
SAS No. 59 became effective. This result indicated success for SAS No. 59.
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Raghunandan and Rama (1995) examined a sample of financially
stressed firms to determine whether auditors had a greater propensity to issue
going concern modified reports after SAS No. 59 became effective. They also
examined a sample of bankrupt companies to determine if more of these
companies received going concern opinions after the effective date of SAS No.
59. The results indicated a greater incidence of such reports to stressed
companies after SAS No. 59. Raghunandan and Ram a also found that
bankrupct companies were more likely to have received modified reports after
SAS No. 59 became effective.
Employing a design similar to that of Raghunandan and Rama (1995),
Carsello, Hermanson, and Huss (1995) tested the hypothesis that auditors in
Big Six firms issued more going concern reports to bankrupt companies after
SAS No. 59. They examined a sample of 250 companies and found that
auditors were not more likely to issue such reports to bankrupt clients. The
two previous studies treated the transition period from SAS No. 34 to SAS No.
59 differently where the latter excluded it from the study while the former
included it. Carsello, Hermanson and Huss (1997) reconciled these two studies
by indicating that the treatment of this transition period substantially affected
the results. The authors noted that there was no correct way of treating this
period and therefore more research was needed with larger windows to reach
more concrete conclusions.
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Summary
The empirical studies reviewed in this section have indicated that issuing
qualified opinions could have negative consequences, such as auditor switching
and the self-fulfilling prophecy, as well and positive consequences, such as
protection from lawsuits and early warnings. Table 2.1 summarizes results of
those studies.
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TABLE 2.1
CONSEQUENCES O F QUALIFIED OPINIONS

Author(s) and Year of
Study

Purpose o f Research

Summary of Findings

Whittred (1980)

Delay of audit reports
due to qualifications.

Audit reports delayed
due to qualifications;
Longer delays for more
serious qualifications.

Chow and Rice (1982)

Propensity of companies
to switch auditors after
qualifications.

More companies
switched auditors after
receiving qualified
opinions, but they did
not get clean opinions
after the switch.

Williams (1984)

Audit partners’
impression of the going
concern opinion.

Partners split on
whether going concern
opinions constituted
self-fulfilling
prophecies.

Schwartz and Menon
(1985)

Propensity of failing
firms to switch auditors
after qualifications.

No evidence of auditor
switching for failing
firms.

Craswell (1988)

Auditor switching for
failing firms after
qualifications in
Australia.

More failing firms
switched auditors after
qualifications, with new
auditors giving clean
opinions.

Holt and Moizer (1990)

Auditors’ and users’
impressions of different
audit opinions in the
U.K.

Com pared to auditors,
users felt generally less
confident in financial
statements containing
going concern audit
opinions.
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TABLE 2.1 (continued)
Author(s) and Year of
Study

Purpose of Research

Summary of Findings

Citron and Taffler
(1992)

Auditor switching, selffulfilling prophecy as
consequences of going
concern opinions in the
U.K.

An association between
going concern opinions
and auditor switching.
No evidence of selffulfilling prophecy.

Garsombke and Choi
(1992)

Association between
going concern opinions
and company failures.

Companies with going
concern opinions had
failure rates higher than
those with clean
opinions.

Abbott (1994)

Audit partners’
impressions of the going
concern opinion.

Partners did not believe
going concern opinions
protected them from
litigation.

Carsello and Palmrose
(1994)

Auditors’ protection
from litigation due to
issuing going concern
opinions.

Plaintiffs with modified
reports had weaker
claims and collected
less money.

Johnson and Khurana
(1995)

Impact of SAS No. 59
on bankrupt companies’
audit reports.

More bankrupt
companies received
going concern opinions
after SAS No. 59.

Raghunandan and
Rama (1995)

Auditors’ propensity to
issue going concern
opinions, and bankrupt
companies’ likelihood
of receiving them after
SAS No. 59.

Auditors more likely to
issue going concern
opinions after SAS No.
59. More bankrupt
companies received
such opinions.
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TABLE 2.1 (continued)
Author(s) and Year of
Study

Purpose of Research

Summary of Findings

Carsello, Hermanson,
and Huss (1995)

Auditors’ likelihood of
issuing going concern
opinions after SAS No.
59.

Auditors not more
likely to issue modified
reports to bankrupt
companies after SAS
No. 59.

Louwers, Messina, and
Richard (1996)

Going concern opinions
as warning devices for
bankruptcy.

A significantly high
percentage of
companies survived
their first modified
report.
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Information Content Market Studies

A number of capital market studies have investigated the information
content of qualified opinions. A review of these studies, their implications, and
their limitations, follows.
Alderman (1977) measured the impact of qualified opinions on the
market’s assessment of two risk components: systematic risk and unsystematic
risk. The sample consisted of 20 firms that received uncertainty qualified
opinions in the 1968 to 1971 period. The control sample consisted of 20 firms
that received unqualified opinions in the period 1965 to 1974. An examination
the stock price of each firm in the sample before and after receiving the
opinion determined changes in risk. The study found no significant differences
between the experimental sample and the control sample. The author
concluded that uncertainty qualifications had little information value regarding
risk to investors.
Firth (1978) tested the impact of qualified opinions in the U.K. He
examined data for the 1,500 largest U.K. firms who had their audit opinions
qualified in the 1974-75 period. The study used the m arket model and
compared the actual returns of a security against those expected if there were
no qualified opinion. Firth divided the sample into (1) general qualifications,
(2) going concern, (3) asset valuation, (4) subsidiary’s audit, and (5) continuing
qualifications. The results indicated significant negative returns associated with
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general qualifications, going concern, and asset valuations. The other
qualifications exhibited little or no negative returns.
Banks and Kinney (1982) examined the impact on stock prices of
different methods for reporting loss contingencies covered by FASB No. 5.
The auditors’ reporting options consisted o f either a footnote disclosure only
or a qualified opinion along with a footnote disclosure, depending on the
auditors’ judgement regarding the uncertainty’s resolution. Their study
controlled for the sign of the unexpected earnings and the footnote disclosure
of the uncertainty which Alderman (1977) had ignored. The authors compared
control and experimental samples consisting of 92 companies each and
compared their stock returns. Firms in the experimental sample had loss
contingencies in some years from 1969 to 1975. Firms in the experimental
sample had significantly worse performances than those in the control sample.
Returns for firms with qualified opinions and footnote disclosures differed from
those in the control sample by more than those with only footnote disclosures.
The authors argued that the audit report did not constitute the only way to
learn about the uncertainty, but the study confirmed the report's importance.
Therefore, Banks and Kinney concluded that qualified opinions had
information content.
Elliott (1982) examined the methodologies of previous information
content studies. He noted that auditors had issued qualified opinions in
conjunction with other information of differing significance. This therefore,
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made it difficult to measure the impact of qualified opinions separately. Bailey
(1982) also had noted this limitation. Elliott found significant negative security
returns before the release of qualified opinions. This indicated that m arket
participants learned of expected qualified opinions using available information
before seeing the audit opinion.
Dodd et al. (1984) examined abnormal stock returns associated with
announcements of qualified opinions and disclaimers of opinions. They found
that many firms experienced abnormal negative performance before the
announcement of qualified opinions, but not after the announcement.
However, the authors noted that their studies, like previous studies, had two
limitations: (1) the problem of determining the exact timing of the audit report
announcement, and (2) the problem of separating the audit report effect from
other concurrent announcements. This study also noted that disclaimers of
opinions appear to have very little information content.
Dopuch, Holthausen, and Leftwich (1986) attempted to overcome
limitations in previous studies by determining the information content of
"subject to" opinions. They examined 109 companies which received qualified
opinions during the 1970 to 1979 period. They investigated whether media
releases (such as in the Wall Street Journal) of qualified opinions produced
different results from 10-K filings investigated in most capital market studies.
The study found significant negative returns associated with media releases of
these opinions. The authors indicated their inability to reconcile their findings
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with previous findings because they could not identify the selection process that
the media employed to release only certain companies’ opinions. In general,
they warned of the difficulties associated with detecting the information content
in “subject to" opinions.
Hopwood, McKeown, and Mutchler (1989) tested the information
content of going concern and other qualified opinions as predictors of
bankruptcy. If proven accurate, these opinions could have served as warning
signals to users. The sample consisted of 60 companies that declared
bankruptcy between 1974 to 1981. The researchers selected a control group of
55 companies for the same period; Additionally they selected a holdout
experimental group and a control group of 32 bankrupt companies for the 1982
to 1985 period. Holdout group data indicated the prediction accuracy of the
opinions. Hopwood, McKeown, and Mutchler concluded that the going
concern modified report and qualified opinions had incremental information
content that could have served to predict bankruptcy. The study supported
users’ arguments that qualified opinions (including going concern) served as
useful red flags.
Loudder et al. (1992) incorporated an expectations variable in
determining the information content of qualified opinions. Specifically, the
authors measured the market’s assessment that auditors would issue qualified
opinions instead of subjecting users to surprise issuances. The sample consisted
of 101 firms with "subject to" opinions between 1983 and 1986. Loudder et al.
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divided the sample into two groups, expected firms and unexpected firms. The
results showed significant negative market reaction to unexpected qualifications
and to delayed issuances of expected qualifications. The authors argued that
"subject to" opinions had information content, thus rendering their elimination
premature.
Choi and Jeter (1992) provided further evidence of qualified opinion
information content. They argued that qualified opinions had the potential of
affecting the market’s expectation by signaling more noise or less persistence
than expected in the earnings numbers. To determine the impact of these
opinions on ERC (Earnings Response Coefficients), or the market’s response
to earnings announcement, they sampled 72 companies receiving qualifications
from 1983 to 1986. They divided the qualifications into going concern
qualifications and all others. They then compared ERC for pre-qualification
periods with those in periods after receipt of qualifications. The results
indicated that the market based less reliance on reported earnings in the going
concern violation sam ple-before and after the qualifications-than in the other
sample. ERC declined significantly after the qualifications for both going
concern and other qualifications. However, the going concern sample had a
less significant decline. These results showed that qualified "subject to"
opinions carried information by increasing users’ uncertainty about the financial
statements, and they resulted in negative returns.
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Frost (1994) extended this line of research by examining the company’s
risk characteristics as perceived by investors if it received an uncertainty-related
modified report. Frost argued that a high-risk company receiving a modified
report could have less negative returns than a low-risk company receiving such
an opinion. She gathered data on 234 companies in the period from 1983 to
1988 and divided the companies into high-risk and low-risk groups. The results
confirmed the hypothesis. Low-risk companies experienced higher abnormal
negative returns after receiving uncertainty-modified reports them did high-risk
companies. The market, therefore, revised its expectations about the company
after learning of the uncertainty through the audit report. Uncertaintymodified reports, therefore, had information content.
Ameen, Chan, and Guffey (1994) investigated the information content of
qualified opinions for Over-the-Counter (OTC) firms. They noted that
previous studies used NYSE and ASE firms and that the results could not
extend to smaller firms traded in the OTC market. The sample consisted of
177 firms receiving qualified opinions from 1974 to 1988. The results indicated
that the market reacted negatively prior to the initial public announcement of
the qualification, but not after the announcement or around it. Negative
returns occurred because of the market’s expectation relative to the
uncertainty. No further negative returns occurred around the announcement
date. They concluded that the announcement of qualified opinions did not
have information content.
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Fleak and Wilson (1994) studied unexpected going concern opinions as
possible causes of negative returns. Their study defined an unexpected going
concern opinion as one which differed from what would be expected based on
previously available information about the company. Their sample consisted of
495 companies receiving going concern opinions from 1979 to 1986. The study
separated the companies into those likely to receive going concern opinions
and those not likely to receive such an opinion based on two models. The
results indicated that only unexpected going concern opinions coincided with
abnormal negative returns. The results did not show any association between
unexpected clean opinions and positive abnormal returns. This study
demonstrated that market participants reacted only to negative surprises and
that expected going concern opinions had no information content.
Seipell and Tunnell (1995) tested the impact of going concern opinions
on 75 firms' unsystematic and systematic risks. They studied the 1983 to 1987
time period. The study matched and compared experimental firms that
received going concern opinions with control firms that did not receive such
opinions. The results revealed an association between an increase in
unsystematic risk and a going concern qualified opinion. This study addressed
the problem of trading frequency. Scholes and Williams (1977) had found that
returns for less frequently traded securities had a downward bias. Seipell and
TunnelTs results indicated the presence of the trading frequency problem.
After allowances for this problem, systematic risk did not increase with the
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issuance of going concern opinions. The authors noted that previous studies
with such an association may have suffered from the nonsynchronous (i.e.,
trading frequency) problem.
Chen and Church (1996) examined the market’s expectation of
bankruptcy based on going concern opinions. They used a sample of 98
bankrupt companies from 1980 to 1988. They separated the sample into
companies that received going concern opinions and those that received clean
opinions, and they compared returns around bankruptcy. The results revealed
that firms receiving going concern opinions before bankruptcy experienced less
negative returns around bankruptcy than those that received clean opinions.
This indicated that going concern opinions had information
content and that they warned the market about forthcoming bankruptcies.

Summary
The previous studies examined the information content of qualified
opinions. For the most part, going concern opinions proved useful in
predicting bankruptcy. Unexpected qualified opinions also proved useful in
revising risk profiles, and they resulted in abnormal negative returns. However,
different methodologies and time periods made these studies’ findings difficult
to compare. Table 2.2 summarizes the results of these studies.
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TABLE 2 2
INFORMATION CONTENT MARKET STUDIES

Author(s) and Year of
Study

Purpose of Research

Summary of Findings

Alderman (1977)

Impact of a qualified
opinion on a firm’s risk
assessment.

Uncertainty
qualifications had little
or no impact on risk
assessment.

Firth (1978)

Impact of different
types of qualifications
on security returns in
the U.K.

Only going concern,
general, and asset
valuation qualifications
had information
content.

Banks and Kinney
(1982)

Impact of uncertainty
reporting and its
method on security
returns.

Uncertainties led to
abnormal negative
returns. Qualified
opinions and footnotes
had more information
content than footnotes
alone.

Elliott (1982)

Methodological issues
and the association
between qualified
opinions timing and
security returns.

Significant negative
returns occurred before
the release of qualified
opinions.

Dodd et al. (1984)

Relationship between
announcements of
qualified opinions and
stock prices.

Abnormal negative
returns occurred before,
but not around or after,
announcements of
qualifications.

Dopuch, Holthausen,
and Leftwich (1986)

Comparative security
price impacts: media
disclosure of qualified
opinions vs. 10-K filings.

More negative returns
associated with media
disclosure of
qualifications than with
routine 10-K filings.
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TABLE 2 2 (continued)
Author(s) and Year of
Study

Purpose of Research

Summary of Findings

Hopwood, McKeown,
and Mutchler (1989)

Association between
qualified opinions and
bankruptcy.

A strong association
between going concern
opinions and
bankruptcy.

Loudder et al. (1992)

Incorporated earnings
expectations into
information content
studies of qualified
opinions.

Disclosure of
unexpected qualified
opinions resulted in
negative returns, as well
as delayed disclosures
of expected
qualifications.

Choi and Jeter (1992)

Impact of qualified
opinions on Earnings
Response Coefficients.

Negative m arket
responsiveness to
qualified opinions; the
opinions increased
earnings noise, and they
decreased persistence.

Frost (1994)

Relationship between
uncertainty- qualified
opinions given to highrisk firms as compared
to low-risk firms.

Low-risk firms receiving
qualified opinions
showed greater negative
returns than high-risk
firms receiving them.

Ameen, Chan, and
Guffey (1994)

Information content of
qualified opinions for
smaller OTC firms.

Abnormal negative
returns before the
announcement date, but
not around it or after it.

Fleak and Wilson
(1994)

Difference between
expected and
unexpected going
concern opinions on
stock prices.

Only unexpected going
concern opinions were
associated with
abnormal negative
returns.

(I
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TABLE 2 2 (continued)
Author(s) and Year of
Study

Purpose of Research

Summary of Findings

Seipel and Tunnell
(1995)

Relationship between
going concern opinions
and changes in
unsystematic and
systematic risk.

Going concern opinions
increased unsystematic
risk, but not systematic
risk.

Chen and Church
(1996)

Usefulness of going
concern opinions m
signaling bankruptcy.

Firms receiving going
concern opinions
experienced less
negative returns around
bankruptcy than those
receiving clean
opinions.
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Information Content Experimental Studies

Few experimental studies have examined the information content of
qualified opinions in the U.S. The experimental studies which have been
conducted typically have focused on users’ reactions to different qualifications
and to different methods of reporting them.
Estes and Reim er (1977) examined the effect of a qualification due to a
minor violation of APB No. 18 where the company carried certain investments
at cost instead of equity. Two groups of bankers responded to a mail
questionnaire. O ne group received a cover letter and descriptive information
about the company, a set of financial statements and footnotes, and an
unqualified audit opinion. The other group received identical information, but
with a qualified opinion. The footnotes for both groups included a description
of the departure from APB No. 18. The bankers provided a loan amount that
they would approve for each company. The results indicated no significant
difference in both groups’ mean loan amounts.
Firth (1979) investigated the impact of going concern qualifications on
bankers’ decisions in the U.K. The sample consisted of several groups of
bankers who received the same information-except for the type of audit
report-about a company. The audit reports were unqualified, qualified due to
a going concern uncertainty, qualified due to asset valuation problems, and
qualified due to a departure from GAAP. The bankers indicated the maximum
amount that they would lend to each company. The mean loan amounts

i!
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ranged from 11 million British Pounds for unqualified opinions to 0.7 million
British Pounds for going concern qualifications. These results indicated a
significant difference in the risk perception based on clean opinions and going
concern opinions. Significant differences also occurred because of asset
valuation qualifications.
Estes and Reimer (1979) provided another study of qualified opinion
information content. After examining the financial statements and "except for"
qualified audit opinions for a number of companies, 1,000 financial analysts
estimated the per-share market value of a composite firm’s stock. That
composite firm data represented average account balances for five real
manufacturing firms. The authors attempted to attribute any significant
difference in decisions to the audit report and not to the company’s financial
statements. To achieve this goal, they designated a violation of APB No. 18 as
the independent variable. They presented two groups of financial analysts with
the same information, except for the audit report. Financial analysts who
reacted to the "except for" opinion estimated a significantly lower stock price
than analysts who reacted to the unqualified opinion. The authors concluded
that qualified opinions had information content to financial analysts. This is
contrary to the results of their earlier (1977) study which showed no
information content to bankers.
Libby provided two significant studies in this line of research concerning
the impact of uncertainties on bank loan officers’ perceptions and decisions.

i\
R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission.

46

Libby (1979a) presented loan officers with 10 different kinds of audit opinions
to test their understanding of the meaning of each opinion and compared their
understanding with that of CPAs’. The opinions ranged from unqualified to
qualified because of uncertainties to disclaimers of opinions. Libby asked
bankers and auditors to answer a number of questions about the reliability of
the financial statements and their usefulness. The results indicated no
significant differences between auditors and bankers in interpreting the
meaning of the audit opinions. The study also showed that uncertainty
qualifications, by themselves, increased bankers’ perception of loan risk. The
latter finding suggested that qualified opinions due to uncertainty had
information content.
In a related study, Libby (1979b) examined the location and method of
disclosing uncertainties. The uncertainty concerned litigation for a defendant
company in a lawsuit. Libby divided loan officers into three groups. Each
received an unqualified opinion, a disclosure only, or a disclosure with a
qualified opinion. The loan officers estimated the appropriate interest rate to
charge above the prime rate. The results showed that the disclosure of the
uncertainty increased bankers’ risk perception. However, adding a qualified
opinion to a footnote disclosure did not affect risk perception. This study did
not find information content in qualified opinions, and it supported the CAR’s
recommendation to eliminate them. Libby concluded that qualified opinions
were redundant in the presence of appropriate footnote disclosure. Berthold
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(1979) and Schultz (1979) criticized Libby’s study because Libby had enclosed
a statem ent predicting the outcome of the uncertainty. Therefore, the test
contained no genuine uncertainty. However, Libby’s study did provide an
im portant insight into banker perceptions of qualified opinions.
Firth (1980) extended his earlier study of bankers’ decision making in
the U.K. The later study investigated whether qualified opinions affected
bankers’ lending decisions. Firth mailed financial statements of two
hypothetical companies to loan officers; those two companies differed only by
audit report type. Company A was in good financial condition and company B
was in poor condition. Firth asked the bankers to state the maximum loan
am ount they would grant to each company. The audit opinions varied as
follows: (1) unqualified, (2) qualified due to going concern uncertainty,
(3) qualified due to asset valuation, and (4) qualified due to departure from
GAAP. The results indicated significant differences in loan amounts between
the company with a clean opinion and the one with a going concern qualified
opinion. The company with a going concern opinion would have received a
substantially smaller loan than the one with a clean opinion. This study,
indicated that, in the U.K., qualified opinions had information content.
Houghton (1983) investigated the information content of qualified
opinions in Australia. The sample consisted of 247 bank loan officers who
received a loan application from a hypothetical company. Houghton divided
the sample into two groups. One group received information about the
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company and an unqualified opinion. The other group received the same
information about the company and a qualified audit opinion. The
qualification referred a lawsuit against the company. The results indicated no
significant differences in bankers’ decisions about the company with a qualified
opinion and the one with the unqualified opinion. The author attributed the
lack of information content to either the audit report’s having no importance
in decision making or to the audit report’s having less importance than other
information in the financial statements.
Abdel-khalik, Graul, and Newton (1986) extended Libby’s (1979b) study
to a Canadian environment. Auditors no longer issued qualified opinions in
Canada at the time of this study, and, therefore, the environment differed from
the one in the U.S. The sample consisted of commercial loan officers who
received financial information about several companies and several different
audit report types. Some audit reports had unqualified opinions, some had a
"two-sided opinion" indicating that presentation in the U.S. would require a
qualification, and some had a "subject to" qualified opinion due to an
uncertainty involving litigation. Each banker assessed each firm’s risk
(measured as an interest rate premium), and each banker estimated the
probability of each firm’s default. The study’s research design attempted to
overcome Libby’s problems. The findings showed that bankers regarded
disclosure of the uncertainty as relevant information. However, the addition of
a "subject to" qualified opinion had no significant impact on bankers’ decisions
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beyond what a footnote only would disclose. These findings supported the
CAR’s recommendation to eliminate uncertainty qualified opinions because of
their redundancy.
Gul (1987) tested the information content of qualified opinions in
Singapore. The study used an actual company with a fictitious name in an
experiment to compare the effects of qualified opinions and footnotes on
bankers’ decisions. Gul studied the effects of three reporting methods: (1) no
uncertainty disclosure, (2) a footnote disclosure only, and (3) a "subject to"
qualified opinion and a footnote disclosure. The uncertainty concerned
pending litigation. Each banker estimated an interest rate premium for a loan
granted to this company. The results indicated that for every additional level
of disclosure, the bankers had an increased perception of risk. Qualified
opinions, therefore, had information content to Singapore bankers. This
conclusion did not support the CAR’s recommendation to eliminate them.
Pringle, Crum, and Swetz (1990) provided an early modified report
impact study on going concern uncertainty due to risk. They divided the
undergraduate student subjects into two groups. The first group received five
sets of financial statements (including footnotes) accompanied by qualified
opinions due to going concern uncertainty for actual companies. The other
group received identical financial statements accompanied by modified reports
(opinions with explanatory paragraphs) due to going concern uncertainty. The
students ranked the five companies in terms of investment potential. The
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authors employed a between-groups and within-groups design to examine
differences in company rankings. The results indicated no significant
differences between subjects who received qualified opinions and those who
received modified reports. The method of reporting going concern did not
m atter as long as the auditor communicated the message. Within-subject
comparisons revealed that subjects who received qualified opinions had more
similar rankings compared to subjects who received modified reports. The
authors attributed this within-subject difference to increased confusion caused
by an unqualified opinion with an explanatory paragraph. This confusion, real
or imaginary, strongly supported the CAR’s recommendation to eliminate all
reference to the uncertainty in the audit report.
Houghton and Messier (1991) examined the effect of qualified opinions
on auditors and bankers. The sample consisted of Florida bankers and
auditors. They utilized six types of audit reports: (1) unqualified, (2) qualified
due to departure from GAAP, (3) qualified due to scope limitation,
(4) modified due to uncertainty, (5) adverse due to departure from GAAP, and
(6) disclaimer of opinion. The results indicated no significant differences in the
meanings of audit reports between bankers and auditors. However, auditors
viewed the wording of the modified report due to uncertainty as more negative
than the bankers, who saw it as neutral. The study did not clearly define
uncertainty, and the wording of the modified report differed from the wording
of SAS No. 58 or SAS No. 59.

A
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LaSalle and Anandarajan (1997) compared the influences of a modified
report due to uncertainties and a disclaimer of opinion on bankers’ decisions.
They provided information about two actual companies to 490 loan officers.
The first company had a material lawsuit uncertainty, and the second company
had going concern uncertainty. They divided the sample into two groups who
received reports for both companies. Each participant received either a
modified report with an explanatory paragraph or a disclaimer of opinion for
each company. Participants granted or rejected a requested line of credit to
each company. None of the loan officers granted the line of credit for the firm
with a disclaimer of opinion, while only 9% agreed to the line of credit for the
firm with going concern uncertainties, but 42% approved credit for the firm
with other uncertainties. The authors concluded that the method of reporting
mattered less for firms with going concern uncertainties than for firms with
other uncertainties. These results suggested that going concern uncertainties,
rather than the auditor’s method of reporting, caused credit rejection.
Bamber and Stratton (1997) provided evidence that the audit report
modified for other uncertainties had information content. In this case, the
uncertainty involved a potential litigation loss. They surveyed 77 bank loan
officers in seven banks and presented them with multi-year financial statements
and the current year’s footnotes that included the uncertainty. The study
divided the participants into eight groups. Each participant in each group
received information about two companies with either a standard audit report
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or a modified report. The results showed that bankers granted a loan less
often to a company with a modified report compared to a company with a
standard report and assigned a higher interest rate premium to the former
company. The bankers also weighted the modified audit report and the
footnote as more important in their decision compared to the standard report.

Summary

The previous experimental studies provided mixed evidence on the
information content of qualified and modified reports. Most of the studies
conducted in the U.S., Canada, and Australia found no significant information
content of these opinions, while studies conducted in other countries found
significant information content. The following table summarizes those studies.
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TABLE 2 3
INFORMATION CONTENT EXPERIMENTAL STUDIES

Author(s) and Year of
Study

Purpose of Research

Summary of Findings

Estes and Reim er
(1977)

Impact of qualified
opinions on bankers’
decisions.

No difference between
amount loaned to firms
with unqualified
opinions accompanied
by foot-notes and firms
with qualified opinions
ac-companied by
footnotes.

Firth (1979)

Impact of qualified
audit opinions for
different reasons on
bankers in the U.K.

Qualified audit opinions
due to going concern
and asset valuation had
significant impacts on
bankers’ credit
decisions.

Estes and Reimer
(1979)

Impact of qualified
opinions on financial
analysts’ stock price
estimates.

Financial analysts
assigned higher risk
(lower stock price) to a
company with a
qualified opinion than
to a comparable same
company with a clean
opinion.

Libby (1979a)

Difference between
auditors’ and bankers’
perceptions of different
audit opinions.

No difference between
bankers’ and auditors’
perceptions.
Uncertainty reporting
increased risk
perception.

Libby (1979b)

Impact of uncertainty
reporting method on
bankers’ loan decisions.

Qualified opinions were
redundant in the
presence of footnote
disclosures.
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TABLE 2 3 (continued)
Author(s) and Year of
Study

Purpose of Research

Summary of Findings

Firth (1980)

Impact of different
qualified opinions for
two companies on
bankers’ decisions in
the U.K.

Qualified opinions due
to going concern
uncertainty and asset
valuation had significant
information content.

Houghton (1983)

Impact of qualified
opinions due to
litigation uncertainty on
bankers in Australia.

No significant
information content
difference between a
qualified opinion and
only a footnote
disclosure.

Abdel-Khalik, Graul,
and Newton (1986)

Extended Libby’s
(1979b) study in
Canada. Impact of
qualification on loan
risk.

No significant risk
difference between
qualified opinion with
footnote and only
footnote. Similar to
Libby’s (1979b)
conclusion.

Gul (1987)

Bankers’ perception of
risk in Singapore due to
uncertainty
qualifications

Risk perception
increased with every
additional level of
disclosure.

Pringle, Crum, and
Swetz (1990)

Risk perception
difference between
qualified and modified
reports due to going
concern uncertainty.

No difference between
qualified opinions and
modified going concern
reports.
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TABLE 2.3 (continued)
Author(s) and Year of
Study

Purpose of Research

Summary of Findings

Houghton and Messier
(1991)

Difference in audit
report meaning between
auditors and bankers.

No difference in
meaning perception
between auditors and
bankers. Auditors
viewed modified reports
as more negative than
bankers.

LaSalle and
Anandarajan (1997)

Difference in bankers’
risk assessment based
on modified reports and
disclaimers of opinions
due to other
uncertainties and going
concern uncertainty.

More bankers rejected
a credit line for going
concern uncertainties
than for other
uncertainties. Reporting
method made a
difference only with
other uncertainties.

Bamber and
Stratton(1997)

Information content of
modified audit report
due to a potential
litigation loss compared
to an unqualified
opinion.

Bankers granted a loan
less often to a company
with a modified report
compared to a company
with an unqualified
opinion. The modified
report due to other
uncertainties had
information content to
bankers.
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The previous literature review indicated the auditing profession’s
concern about the expectation gap. The ASB issued SAS No. 58, SAS No. 59,
and recently amended SAS No. 58 to deal with this issue. The capital markets
literature partially supported users’ argument for the usefulness of warning
signals. However, most of the experimental studies in the U.S. have shown that
qualified or modified reports, even those concerning going concern
uncertainties, contained no significant warning signals beyond what appropriate
footnotes disclosed. The following chapter addresses the current study of
modified report information content.
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CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This chapter discusses the research methodology employed in this study.
It presents the theory leading to the research, as well as the study’s hypotheses.
Discussions of the experimental design, the sample, and the statistical tests
follow.

Theory and Hypotheses Development
As presented in the previous chapter, substantially less research has
examined the going concern explanatory paragraph in the audit report
compared to the qualified "subject to" opinion. Therefore, this study has
investigated the usefulness of the explanatory paragraph in decision-making and
the existence or (non-existence) of additional signals attributable to it.
The theory behind the current study originated in the CAR’s
recommendation, as implemented by the ASB in SAS No. 59, and SAS No. 79,
which dealt with going concern uncertainties. Previous experimental studies,
especially those dealing with bankers, have reinforced that theory.
In 1978, the CAR recommended that the audit report not contain
references to uncertainties, as long as footnotes provided adequate disclosures.

57
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The commission regarded the inclusion of this information in the audit report
as redundancy that did not serve a useful purpose. The Commission noted,
however, that users demanded appropriate disclosure of the uncertainty to draw
their attention to the problem and to enable them to make informed decisions.
From the ASB’s point of view, the going concern issue deserved special
attention and warranted a special standard, SAS No. 59. However, the
reasoning behind SAS No. 59 bore a similarity to that behind SAS No. 58,
namely the auditor’s responsibility to emphasize uncertainty in an explanatory
paragraph. Many users did not fully understand the Board’s objective and
believed that the explanatory paragraph contained additional information on
the uncertainty. This misunderstanding prompted the board to amend SAS No.
58 and eliminate the explanatory paragraph requirement.
The ASB revealed a major reason for issuing SAS No. 79 when it stated
that: "The required uncertainties explanatory paragraph does not and should not
communicate new information to financial statement users" (emphasis added).
Therefore, if the ASB believed that the uncertainty paragraph merely
emphasized the uncertainty as explained in the footnote, one could have
reasonably hypothesized the same belief for the going concern uncertainty. At
the time of this study, it appears that the ASB did not indicate the same belief
for going concern uncertainty.
The foregoing has relied upon the CAR’s recommendation, its
implementation by the ASB, and the ASB’s specific mention of the role of the

ii
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explanatory paragraph. It has led to a general hypothesis that the user will
make the same decision based on an audit report with an explanatory
paragraph as he will based on an audit report without the paragraph; the
paragraph constitutes a redundancy (CAR), and it does not communicate new
information (ASB, SAS No. 79).
Estes and Reimer (1977); Libby (1979b); Abdel-Khalik, Graul, and
Newton (1986); Pringle, Crum and Swetz (1990); and LaSalle and
Anandarajan (1997) tested this hypothesis. They all reached the same general
conclusion: the method of reporting the uncertainty, including the going
concern uncertainty, did not significantly affect users’ decisions. This
conclusion held for qualified opinions (Estes and Reim er (1977), Libby(1979b)
and Abdel-Khalik, Graul and Newton (1986)) and for modified reports
(Pringle, Crum, and Swetz (1990) and LaSalle and Anandarajan (1997)). In
other words, the uncertainty itself, rather than the reporting method affected
the decision. These findings contradicted users’ arguments about the usefulness
of the reporting method.
This study has tested four hypotheses relative to the information content
of explanatory paragraphs.
Hypothesis 1. Bankers’ estimate of the likelihood of granting a line of
credit to a given company based upon a modified going concern report and a
footnote disclosure would not differ substantially from the estimate to the
same company on the basis of an unqualified opinion and a footnote
disclosure.
Hypothesis 2: The interest rate that bankers would charge for a line of
credit to a given company based upon a modified going concern report and a
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footnote disclosure would not differ substantially from the interest rate the
bankers would charge to the same company on the basis of an unqualified
opinion and a footnote disclosure.
Hypothesis 3: Bankers’ confidence in their lending decision for a given
company based upon a modified going concern report and a footnote
disclosure would not differ substantially from their confidence for a loan to the
same company on the basis o f an unqualified opinion and a footnote
disclosure.
Hypothesis 4: Bankers’ perception of bankruptcy likelihood for a given
company based upon a modified going concern report and a footnote
disclosure would not differ substantially from their perception about the same
company on the basis of an unqualified opinion and a footnote disclosure.

The first hypothesis addressed the company’s relative risk, with the
expectation that lower likelihood of granting the line of credit would coincide
with loan officers’ perceptions of higher risk. The interest rate that a bank
would charge on a line of credit could also serve as an estimate of risk. The
second hypothesis, in the null form, therefore, has addressed that aspect of risk
measurement.
As its secondary objective, this study sought to determine the "side
effects" of the going concern explanatory paragraph. According to the CAR,
the clause "subject to" gave some users the false impression that upon
resolution of the uncertainty, the company would restate its financial position.
While the going concern explanatory paragraph continued to contain a
statement that "the financial statements did not include any adjustments that
might result from the outcome of this uncertainty," users’ interpretation of that
statement remained unclear. Any confusion, however, should tend to
undermine users’ confidence in the financial statements. Accordingly, the
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third hypothesis addressed the issue of loan officers’ confidence in their
decision.
In making its recommendation to eliminate qualified opinions, the CAR
noted that some users believed that the absence of a qualification indicated no
uncertainties. However, the commission noted that all businesses faced a
certain degree of risk, and they considered a user misperception undesirable.
The previous arguments have led to the assumption that users receiving a
modified report (i.e., an explanatory paragraph) would perceive a higher degree
of uncertainty (bankruptcy in the case of going concern modified reports) as
opposed to users receiving an unqualified opinion (i.e., with no explanatory
paragraph). Hypothesis 4 addressed this concern.

Research Method
Experimental Design

This study utilized an experimental method, sometimes called intact
equivalent design, to test the four hypotheses. It divided the subjects into two
groups that resembled each other as much as possible. As noted by Bailey’s
(1982) criteria, this served as an appropriate design for testing the effect of
audit opinion attributes; it avoided the major problem associated with market
studies, namely audit reports released concurrent with financial information.
Those concurrent releases generally have added to the difficulty of separating
the effect of the audit report from the financial information.
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The two groups made particular estimates and indicated certain
perceptions. The intact equivalent design method compared the results in a
between-groups analysis. Pany and Reckers (1987) had examined the merit of
within-subjects vs. between-subjects designs and concluded that betweensubjects designs produced superior analyses. Applying Pany and Reckers’
arguments to the current study, if within-subjects design was used, it would
have been possible for a respondent to express his individual preference for the
explanatory paragraph regardless of its actual information content. The
between-subject design avoided this problem by presenting each subject with
only one alternative.
Kinney (1986) had offered a discussion of common problems with
between-subjects designs. He had noted that in order to measure the effect of
X (treatment) on Y (decision), the researcher had to recognize V s (other
factors) that may have influenced Y. Relevant V’s, according to Kinney (1986)
included the subjects’ personality traits, mathematical ability, education,
experience, and firm association. This study treated the presence of V’s
through two approaches. First, the study specifically incorporated other factors
possibly affecting a lending decision into the decision-making model and
recognized that those factors may have had an impact on the different Y’s.
Specifically, lending officers’ experience, accounting education, auditing
education, and bank size comprised the V’s.
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The study then randomized away the remaining V s (individual
respondent’s risk preference or individual bank risk preference) in the total
sample. On average, this made the two groups equivalent on the V s. In as
much as possible, this design isolated the effect of the treatment on the lending
decision. In terms of the previous discussion this exposed one group to a
modified going concern audit report, and it exposed the other group to an
unqualified audit opinion. Both groups had access to the same financial
statements and company information.

Sample Selection

The subjects of this study consisted of commercial loan officers. The
study used them because of the lending decision's importance to companies
who frequently resort to bank financing. Lending decisions also m attered to
the ASB because bankers make extensive use of financial information
(Stephens (1980)) and the audit report. Any inappropriate reporting policies
by the ASB, therefore, can have consequences on both bankers and companies.
Users, including bankers, also provided the most input to SAS No. 59 exposure
draft which indicated that they considered going concern reporting a major
issue.
The sample for this study was selected from a database provided by the
Polk Bank Directory. That database provided addresses of loan officers at
different banks around the country. The study targeted no particular
geographic area. The loan officers received the questionnaire in their offices
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and worked in banks with at least $100 million of assets. Two factors made the
last condition necessary. First, smaller banks may or may not have required
audited financial statements in a lending decision; therefore, these loan officers
may or may not have understood the different types of audit reports. Second,
the study used an actual public company (as explained later) that made it
necessary for sampled banks to have the ability to lend money to such a
customer. Since most smaller banks face capital constraints and probably do
not deal with such companies, loan officers of smaller banks may not have
provided realistic responses.
Each selected banker received an actual company’s financial statements,
an audit report, footnotes, and a questionnaire. Each of the two equal groups
in the sample received the same information except for the audit report. One
group received a going concern modified audit report and a footnote explaining
the going concern situation. This is the current practice required by SAS No.
59. The other group received an unqualified audit opinion and the same
footnote. This is not the current way of reporting going concern uncertainty.

Case Company
Data for the company selected as a case example appeared in the
Compact Disclosures database and met four criteria: (1) the company had
publicly traded--and still actively traded-stock (i.e., had not declared
bankruptcy); (2) it had received a going concern opinion in the most recent
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annual report; (3) it had at least one shareholder, one employee, a positive
cash balance, inventory; and finally, (4) it was incorporated in the U.S.
After determining the pool of companies that met the stated criteria, the
screening process considered the company’s industry, audit report modification,
and size. The process eliminated companies in industries such as oil and gas
and medical technology due to the possible unfamiliarity of many loan officers
with their business conditions. The process then examined audit report
modifications to eliminate any companies that received a modification for
reasons other than going concern uncertainties, or in addition to such
uncertainties. For example, some companies faced several uncertainties such
as a lawsuit requiring an explanatory paragraph, as well as going concern
difficulties requiring another explanatory paragraph. The process eliminated
such companies because of uncertainties as to whether loan officers would have
reacted to the other uncertainty paragraph, the going concern issue paragraph,
or both. Also, the screening process eliminated companies that recently had
adopted a new FASB standard or otherwise changed accounting methods.
Finally, the process reviewed each company’s size in terms of total assets and
total sales in order to match the sample company’s needs with the lending
capacities of the banks included in the survey.

Case Development
The company actually chosen manufactured and distributed cosmetics
and other beauty products and qualified as a "typical customer" for many banks,

ii
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especially with its $10 million in assets and $32 million in sales. Information
related to the business, stock prices, ownership, and employees was taken from
the firm’s most recent 10-K report. The information package also included
condensed financial statements, the audit report, and relevant footnotes in
summarized form. However, the going concern footnote appeared exactly as
written in the Form 10-K for that year.
In the next case development step, selected loan officers reviewed the
case and the questionnaire. The loan officers indicated the need for additional
information about the company’s business, as well as a summary of its
outstanding debts. They also suggested that an appropriate loan amount for
this company would be in the $750,000 - $1 million range. That amount
matched the minimum reasonable requirements of the sample company with
the lending capacities of surveyed banks. They also indicated that the
information package should include the purpose of the loan and available
collateral; they assigned little likelihood to a bank’s granting an unsecured line
of credit. The discussions with the loan officers led to the choice of a one-year
secured working capital line of credit in the range of $750,000 - $1 million, with
the accounts receivable and inventory serving as collateral.
The information package withheld the name of the company and its
subsidiaries to avoid biasing their opinion for or against this company. Some of
these bankers may have dealt with this company or known about it. The
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package did not reveal the audit firm name. A sample of the case study is
provided in Appendices A and B.

Questionnaire and Task

The cover letter did not specifically reveal the purpose of the study in
order to avoid the influence of the bankers’ personal opinions regarding the
explanatory paragraph on the decision. However, the cover letter noted that
the study addressed risk. Completing the survey instrument required no more
than 20 minutes of each respondent’s time. The consulting loan officers
deemed this range reasonable. Appendix A also includes a copy of the
questionnaire.
The first group of questions asked the loan officers to estimate the
likelihood of their granting the requested line of credit. The questionnaire
provided a seven-point Likert scale for that answer. The phrasing of the
question controlled for accountability in organizations. According to Fandt and
Ferris (1990), accountability can cause employees to make more conservative
decisions. In this case, it could have caused the loan officers to reject the line
of credit for reasons unrelated to the study. The questionnaire then asked the
loan officers to estimate a risk premium above the prime rate. Because banks
have different prime rates, the questionnaire gave a specified prime rate as a
starting point.
O ther questions were designed to measure bankruptcy estimate and
confidence levels. They, also, utilized a seven-point Likert scale. Finally, the
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questionnaire asked for demographic characteristics such as experience,
accounting education, auditing education, and bank size. These characteristics
possibly could serve as explanatory variables that could have influenced
different estimates.

Statistical Tests

The statistical tests employed to test the hypotheses depended, among
other things, on the measurement scale used to measure the estimate or the
perception. Several types of scales exist: Nominal, ordinal, interval and ratio.
This study used ordinal and interval scales. An ordinal scale implies a
statem ent of "greater than" or "less than” where if a > b and b > c then a > c
without stating how much greater or less. Emory and Cooper (1991) explained
that an ordinal scale is like a rubber yardstick that can stretch varying amounts
across its length. Thus, the real difference between 1 and 2 may be more or
less than the difference between 2 and 3. Interval scales ,on the other hand,
require that the distance between 1 and 2 equals the distance between 2 and 3.
M athematical computations can be used on interval scales where the mean is
the measure of central tendency.
It is important for the researcher to correctly classify a measurement
scale since the statistical tests employed will depend on this classification. For
example, parametric statistics, such as ANOVA, are usually more powerful tests
than nonparametric tests such as chi-square tests. However, parametric tests
can only be used with a measurement scale that is at least interval, provided
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that other assumptions are met, as explained later. The questionnaire used in
this study gathered information from bankers through two methods: a sevenpoint Likert scale where the respondent had to estimate his perception on this
scale and an interest rate estimate where the respondent estimated an actual
interest rate. Although the latter form of measurement is easy to classify as
interval, the former scale is not easily classified.
According to Emory and Cooper (1991), many behavioral researchers
use Likert scales as interval scales and therefore apply parametric tests to the
data. Seigel and Castellan (1988) noted that the researcher would actually be
adding information if he used parametric tests on data that was less than
interval because he was assuming that the distances within the scale were
equal. On the other hand, Anderson (1980) noted that the difference between
parametric and nonparametric tests was not great insofar as significance level
and power were concerned. Therefore, the type of measurement scale used
had little relevance in selecting the statistical tests.
Srinivasan and Basu (1989) noted that ordinal scales were easy to use
and they generated a higher response rate. They also noted that continuous
variables gave a false sense of precision since most subjects would choose
multiples of 10 when responding on a scale of 1 to 100, for example.
Srinivasan and Basu showed that ordinal scales could be used as metric
measures with very little loss of information resulting from a smaller interval
and they quantified this loss of information. Assuming that Likert scales were

R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission.

70

ordinal scales, they developed an index of metric quality defined as the ratio of
the predictive power of the ordered categorical variable to the predictive power
of the underlying continuous variable. They found that the loss of information
was less than 10% when at least a five point scale was used. Therefore, they
recommended the use of a scale of at least five equal categories.
Because the issue of treating a Likert scale as ordinal or interval was
controversial, this study employed both parametric and nonparametric tests on
the data. Nonparametric tests were used to ease the restrictive assumptions
underlying parametric tests.

Parametric Tests

Emory and Cooper (1991) noted that parametric tests, in general, make
the following assumptions about the data. First, it is assumed that both group
populations had a normal distribution. Second, it is assumed that these
populations have equal variances and finally, the observations should be
independent. They argued that some parametric tests were robust to minor
violations of these assumptions while other tests were not.

Equality of Means

The t test measured the equality of the means of two independent
samples. It tested whether the estimate or the perception made by the group
receiving a modified report and footnote differed significantly from the one
made by the group receiving the unqualified report and the footnote. The test
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determined whether the mean likelihood of granting the line of credit differed
significantly between groups, whether the level of confidence and bankruptcy
perception differed, and whether the interest rate estimates differed. If the two
sample means were found to be significantly different, the null hypotheses
would be rejected and if the difference was not significant, they would not be
rejected.

Ordinary Least Squares

Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression determined the impact, if any,
of the explanatory variables on each estimate or perception. For example, did
factors such as experience as a loan officer, accounting and audit education,
and bank size affect the likelihood of granting the line of credit? In this case,
the dependent variable consisted of the estimate (or the perception) and
explanatory items comprised the independent variables. The study employed
the following model, and it used Ordinary Least Squares separately for each
estimate or perception.

Y = BO + BlParag + B2Exp + B3Acc + B4Audit + B5Size + e

where:
Y

= the likelihood of granting the line of credit, the level of
confidence, the estimate of bankruptcy (all on a 1 to 7 scale)
and the interest rate estimate.

Parag =

1 if received the explanatory paragraph
0 if received only the footnote

J
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Exp

= 1 if less than 5 years of experience
2 if between 5 and 10 years
3 if between 11 and 15 years
4 if between 16 and 20 years
5 if more than 20 years of experience

Acc

= 1 if less than 2 accounting courses
2 if 2 or 3 courses
3 if 4 or 5 courses
4 if 6 or 7 courses
5 if more than 7 courses

Audit = 1 if respondent had an auditing course
0 if respondent did not have an auditing course
Size

= 1 if between $100 and $299.9 million of assets
2 if between $300 and $499.9 million
3 if between $500 and $999.9 million
4 if between $1 and $4.9 billion
5 if over $5 billion of assets

e

= the error term

B0

= the intercept

B l, B2, B3, B4 and B5 = parameters estimates.

If a statistically significant relationship was found between any of the
explanatory variables and the dependent variable, this would be useful to
companies in their search for a loan since granting it might depend on a
particular loan officer or a particular bank.

Nonparametric Tests

According to Emory and Cooper(1991), nonparametric tests are most
often used when the assumptions underlying the parametric tests are not met.
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They also noted the ease of use of these tests and that their efficiency is usually
about 95% compared to similar parametric tests.
This study used the Kolmogorov-Smimov two-sample test. This test is
primarily concerned with the agreement between two cumulative distributions ,
but both represent sample values. The purpose of the test is to determine
whether the two distribution functions associated with the two populations are
identical or not. Therefore, it draws conclusions about the two group
populations of bankers based on the two samples of respondents. Conover
(1980) explained that other tests such as the median test or the Mann-Whitney
test may detect differences between two means or medians, but they may not
detect differences of other types, such as differences in variances. The
advantage of the Kolmogorov-Smimov test is that it is consistent against all
types of differences that may exist between the two distribution functions. This
test assumed only that the two samples were random samples and that they
were mutually independent. According to Conover (1980), for this test to be
exact, the random variables were assumed to be continuous. However, the test
was still valid with discrete variables and produced conservative results. This
meant that approximate results would be obtained that would be slightly larger
than actual results.
If F(X) represents the distribution function of the group receiving the
modified report and the footnote diclosure while G(X) represents the
distribution function of the group receiving the unqualified report and the
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footnote disclosure. The null hypothesis in this case would be that F(X) =
G(X) and the alternative hypothesis would be that they were not equal. The
test proceeded by calculating the maximum absolute difference between the
two distribution functions and compared this calculated difference against a
tabulated difference. The significance level for a two-tailed test was set at 0.10.
If the calculated difference was larger than the tabulated difference, the null
hypothesis was rejected and concluded that the explanatory paragraph had
information content, and if it were smaller, the null hypothesis could not be
rejected.

Summary

This chapter presented the theory leading to the study’s hypotheses, the
case selection and development procedures and the statistical tests employed.
Parametric (t-test and regression) and nonparametric tests (the KolmogorovSmimov test) were employed depending on the type of scale used and the
assumptions about the data.
The following chapter presents the results of the data analysis. This is
followed by the results of the different statistical tests employed and the
general conclusions of these results.
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CHAPTER 4

DATA COLLECTION, ANALYSIS,
AND RESULTS

The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the survey data collection
procedures and results. It explains the two major parts of data collection: the
pilot study and the main study. A discussion of the response rate as well as the
sample characteristics is presented. In addition, a test of potential nonresponse
bias is discussed. This is followed by a review of the data analysis methods and
hypotheses tests.

Data Collection Procedures

To collect the survey data, two phases were essential: the pilot study
and the main part of the study.

The Pilot Study

The pilot study had several purposes. First, since the questions asked
were not replicated from other studies, it was necessary to determine whether
the bankers understood the meaning of each question and could easily answer
it without confusion. Second, even though the case information and
questionnaire were developed after consulting with local bankers, it was
75
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important to determine whether any necessary information was missing.
Finally, the pilot study would give the researcher an indication of the potential
response rate for the main study which would help in planning the appropriate
sample size. The sample size for the pilot study needed to be large enough to
reach a representative sample of bankers yet small enough to fulfill the limited
objectives of the pilot study. A sample of 100 was deemed appropriate.
To select a random sample from the database, each name and address
was given a number. The total number of names and addresses were divided
by 100 to obtain an interval. A random starting point was blindly selected from
the first interval and every nth name and address thereafter was selected to
reach a total sample size of 100. This method of systematic random sampling
is widely used by auditors in selecting items such as accounts receivable for
confirmation.
The selected bankers were then divided into two equal groups and
mailed a sample case along with questions and a postage-paid return envelope.
The respondent was asked to indicate the date when he completed this
questionnaire. This date would serve later to test for any difference between
early and late respondents. It was determined that using the date of
completion was better than the date of mailing since different banks had
different mailing systems and a letter could be mailed the following day or it
could take up to a week for it to be mailed. This prediction was confirmed by
comparing the noted date of completion to the postmark date on the return
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envelope. It was found that many responses were mailed immediately while
others took several days. Most of the responses were received within a twoweek period after the initial mailing with a few received in the third and fourth
weeks. Out of the total of 100 mailings, 15 return envelopes were received.
Three respondents indicated that the bank did not have a commercial lending
department and therefore were not able to provide a usable response. There
were 12 usable responses, representing a usable response rate of 12%. They
consisted of seven responses from the group that received the modified report
and the footnote and five responses from the group receiving the unqualified
report and the footnote. All respondents answered all the questions. In other
words, no information was missing.
The information provided by the bankers was analyzed and it appeared
that they fully understood the questions. Therefore, the pilot study fulfilled its
three main objectives: the questions were understood, no necessary
information was missing, and a predicted response rate was obtained.

The Main Study

After the pilot study was completed, it was determined that no changes
were needed in the case or the questionnaire. Therefore, the main part of the
study was initiated.
Assuming that the response rate in the main study would be similar to
the one in the pilot study, a sample size of 2,100 was deemed appropriate.
This sample would be large enough to provide meaningful statistical analysis.

J
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Two mailings were conducted: the first mailing (consisting of 900 bankers)
covered the Northeastern and Southeastern U.S. and the second mailing
(consisting of 1,200 bankers) covered the rest of the country. A t test on the
likelihood of granting the credit scale indicated no significant difference
between the two mailings for the group receiving the modified report and the
footnote (t = -0.7, p = 0.47) and for the group receiving the unqualified
report and the footnote (t = -0.21, p = 0.83). The sample selection method
was the same as the pilot study. Even though the database provided the names
and addresses of the vice presidents for lending in these banks, the cover letter
indicated that they could forward the case to another loan officer in their
banks.
Most of the responses were received in the two-week period following
the mailing, although a few were received up to four weeks later. A total of
290 responses were received representing a general response rate of 13.8%.
The first mailing generated 130 responses of which 117 responses were usable.
The usable response rate was 13%. The second mailing generated 160
responses of which 153 responses were usable. The usable response rate was
12.75%. Therefore, the main part of the study consisted of 270 responses
representing a response rate of 12.85%.
The unusable responses were similar to the ones received in the pilot
study. The bankers indicated that their banks were not involved in commercial
lending, and therefore, the questionnaire was returned intact. Examining both
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groups under consideration, 134 responses were returned from the group
receiving the modified report and the footnote while 136 responses were
returned from the group receiving the unqualified report and the footnote.
Examining the postmark stamp on the return envelope, it was determined that
the respondents were scattered across the country. Out of the 270 responses
received, only eight contained partially missing information. For example, a
questionnaire would be missing an interest rate or a confidence estimate. In
analyzing the data, if a particular scale or interest rate were missing, the
respondent was omitted from this particular analysis.

Test for Nonresponse Bias

A common consideration in survey studies is the impact of
nonrespondents on the study’s conclusions. If the nonrespondents represent a
significant percentage, some concern exists that they have characteristics
different from the respondents’.
A common technique used by researchers to test for nonresponse bias is
to compare early respondents to late respondents to determine if their answers
to the same question were different. This technique assumes that
nonrespondents possess the same characteristics as late respondents. The null
hypothesis in this case was that there was no difference between early and late
respondents. This analysis was separately conducted on both groups of
bankers. To determine early and late respondents, the date of completing the
questionnaire was used. The whole period was divided in two periods and the
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early and late respondents were identified. A t test was used to test for any
difference between early and late respondents on the likelihood of granting the
credit scale. The results are shown in Table 4.1.
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TABLE 4.1
COMPARISON OF EARLY AND LATE RESPONDENTS

■B
M

sS

i i i ail

Group receiving the modified report and footnote
Early

70

2.35

1.52

0.18

Late

68

2.43

1.43

0.17

-030

0.76

Group receiving the unqualified report and footnote
Early

66

2.39

1.39

0.17

Late

69

2.20

1.17

0.14

0.86
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Based on the T values of -0.30 and 0.86 and the corresponding P values
of 0.76 and 0.39, the null hypothesis of no difference between early and late
respondents could not be rejected at the 0.05 level of significance. This
conclusion held true for the group receiving the modified report and the
footnote disclosure and the group receiving the unqualified report and the
footnote disclosure. Therefore, if nonrespondents possessed the same
characteristics as late respondents, the results of this study would not be
significantly different.

Research Results
After determining that potential nonresponse bias should not
significantly affect the survey’s results, the research investigated the different
hypotheses. The group receiving the modified report and the footnote is
referred to as "Group P & F." The group receiving the unqualified report and
the footnote is referred to as "Group F."

Hypotheses Tests
The first hypothesis investigated whether the group receiving the
modified report and the footnote would differ significantly in its likelihood of
granting a line of credit from the group receiving the unqualified report and
the footnote. This hypothesis was designed to measure risk perception, where
the lower the likelihood of granting a line of credit, the higher the perception
of risk. It is restated as follows:

I
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Hypothesis 1: Bankers’ estimate of the likelihood o f granting a line of
credit to a given company based upon a modified going concern report and a
footnote disclosure would not differ substantially from the estimate to the
same company on the basis o f an unqualified opinion and a footnote
disclosure.

A t test was employed to test this hypothesis and the results are shown
in Table 4.2.
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TABLE 42,
COMPARISON OF BOTH GROUPS’ LENDING ESTIMATE
(on a 1 to 7 scale)

IB—
illpm
Group
F

140

235

1.33

0.11

Group
P & F

141

2.42

1.47

0.12

-0.38

0.69

where:
Group F = Group receiving the unqualified report and the footnote
Group P & F = Group receiving the modified report and the footnote
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The results revealed the following findings. First, for both groups, the
m ean likelihood of granting the line of credit was low. This m eant that, in
general, bankers were reluctant to recommend a line of credit to a company
exhibiting going concern difficulty. Second, the difference between both groups
was not statistically significant. Based on the T value of -0.38 and its
corresponding P value of 0.69, the null hypothesis of no difference between the
two groups in their lending estimate could not be rejected at the 0.05 level of
significance. A sample of both groups’ comments on the reasons for their
estim ate is provided in Appendix C.
The second hypothesis investigated whether both groups were
significantly different in their interest rate estimate. It is restated as follows:
Hypothesis 2: The interest rate that bankers would charge for a line of
credit to a given company based upon a modified going concern report and a
footnote disclosure would not differ substantially from the interest rate the
bankers would charge to the same company on the basis of an unqualified
opinion and a footnote disclosure.

This hypothesis was similar to the first in that it measured risk where
the higher the interest rate to charge the company, the higher the perception
of risk. The results of the t test for equality of means are shown in Table 4.3.
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TABLE 4 3
COMPARISON OF BOTH GROUPS’ INTEREST RATE ESTIMATE
(above prime rate)

Group

8BBI— I I I 111 H I

Group
F

139

2.48

0.88

0.07

Group
P&F

141

2.50

1.01

0.08

-0.17

0.86

where:
Group F = Group receiving the unqualified report and the footnote
Group P & F = Group receiving the modified report and the footnote
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The results showed that the mean interest rate that would be charged to
this company by both groups was about 2.5% above the prime rate. Based on
the T value of -0.17 and its corresponding P value of 0.86, the null hypothesis
of no difference between the two groups in their interest rate estimate could
not be rejected at the 0.05 level of significance.
The third hypothesis tested for any difference between the two groups in
their level of confidence in their estimates. Confidence in the estimate was a
measure of any side effects of the explanatory paragraph. Confidence
measured the quality of the lending decision where less confidence indicated
lower quality for the decision. The hypothesis is restated as follows:
Hypothesis 3: Bankers’ confidence in their lending estimate for a given
company based upon a modified going concern report and a footnote
disclosure would not differ substantially from their confidence for a line of
credit to the same company on the basis of an unqualified opinion and a
footnote disclosure.

The t test results are shown in Table 4.4.
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TABLE 4.4
COMPARISON OF BOTH GROUPS’ CONFIDENCE
(on a I to 7 scale)

Group
F

139

Group
P& F

141

WMH i

pul(U

5.86

1.28

0.10

5.72

1.25

0.10

0.92

0.35

where:
Group F = Group receiving the unqualified report and the footnote
Group P & F = Group receiving the modified report and the footnote
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The results showed that, in general, bankers felt confident in thenlending estimate for the line of credit. Even though the group that received
the unqualified report and the footnote was slightly more confident in its
lending estimate than the group that received the modified report and the
footnote, the difference was not statistically significant. Based on the T value
of 0.92 and its corresponding P value of 0.35, the null hypothesis of no
difference between the two groups in their confidence level could not be
rejected at the 0.05 level of significance.
The fourth hypothesis tested for any difference in perception of
bankruptcy between the two groups where a significantly higher estimate of
bankruptcy by the group receiving the modified report and the footnote
indicates information content attributable to the explanatory paragraph. It is
restated as follows:
Hypothesis 4: Bankers’ perception of bankruptcy likelihood for a given
company based upon a modified going concern report and a footnote
disclosure would not differ substantially from their perception about the same
company on the basis o f an unqualified opinion and a footnote disclosure.

The t test results are shown in Table 4.5.
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TABLE 4.5
COMPARISON OF BOTH GROUPS’
BANKRUPTCY PERCEPTION
(on a 1 to 7 scale)

Oroup
Group
F
Group
P&F

— IB —
138

3.85

1.33

0.11

139

4.01

1.31

0.11

-0.99

0.31

where:
Group F = Group receiving the unqualified report and the footnote
Group P & F = Group receiving the modified report and the footnote
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These results showed that, in general, bankers had a neutral estimate of
the likelihood that this company would declare bankruptcy in the next 12
months. In other words, in their view, the chance of bankruptcy was about
equal to the chance of survival. Even though the group receiving the modified
report and the footnote had a slightly higher perception of bankruptcy than the
other group, this difference was not significant. Based on the T value of -0.99
and its corresponding P value of 0.31, the fourth hypothesis of no difference
between the two groups in their perception of bankruptcy could not be rejected
at the 0.05 level of significance.

Summary
The previous t-tests have investigated any difference between the group
receiving the modified report and the footnote and the group receiving the
unqualified report and the footnote. The results revealed that there was no
statistical difference between these two groups on any of the scales or the
interest rate estimate.

Ordinary Least Squares

In addition to the above statistical tests, OLS regression was used to
investigate whether any of the demographic characteristics of lending officers
or their banks had an impact on the estimates or the perceptions. In the first
test, the likelihood of granting the line of credit estimate was the dependent
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variable and the different demographic characteristics were the independent
variables. The results are revealed in Table 4.6.
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TABLE 4.6
EFFECT OF DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS
ON THE LENDING ESTIMATE
(280 observations)

■

■ ■

Interc.

2.08

6.32

0.0001

Parag

0.08

0.52

0.60

Exp

0.01

0.23

0.81

Acc

0.10

1.49

0.13

Audit

0.10

0.57

0.56

Asset

-0.06

-1.03

0.30

0.80

where:
Parag = The explanatory paragraph
Exp

= Loan officers’ experience

Acc

= Loan officers’ accounting education

Audit

= Loan officers’ audit education

Asset

= Bank asset size
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Since there was no single explanatory variable that was statistically
significantly different from zero at the 0.05 level, the null hypothesis that there
was no relationship between the dependent variable and all of the suggested
explanatory variables could not be rejected at the 0.05 level of significance.
This meant that none of the demographic characteristics of the bankers or the
banks had an impact on the likelihood of granting the line of credit.
The results of examining the potential impact of these same
demographic characteristics on the bankers’ estimate of the interest rate are
shown in Table 4.7.

i
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TABLE 4.7
EFFECT OF DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS
ON THE INTEREST RATE
(above prime rate)
(279 observations)

Mm
Interc.

2.38

10.85

0.0001

Parag

0.03

0.32

0.74

Exp

0.10

2.49

0.013**

Acc

-0.05

-1.17

0.24

Audit

0.14

1.14

0.25

Asset

-0.07

-1.70

0.08***

** significant at the 0.05 level

2.13

*** significant at the .10 level

where:
Parag = The explanatory paragraph
Exp

= Loan officers’ experience

Acc

= Loan officers’ accounting education

Audit

= Loan officers’ audit education

Asset

= Bank asset size
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Among all the possible explanatory variables, experience as a loan
officer attained statistical significance at the 0.05 level. With a positive
coefficient estimate, this means that the more experience loan officers
possessed, the higher the interest rate they would charge to a company. A
possible explanation for this significance is that loan officers with more
experience were better able to assess a company’s risk profile in a lending
recommendation because of their past dealings with similar companies. For a
going concern situation, this assessment led to a higher risk profile which in
turn led to a higher interest rate. In addition, bank assets was also significant
at the .10 level. In this case, the higher the bank’s assets, the lower the
premium interest rate the bank would charge this company. A possible
explanation is that larger banks, because of their standing in the industry, are
better able to offer lower loan rates to risky customers than other smaller
banks that can not afford this advantage to risky customers.
OLS regression was also used to measure the impact of the explanatory
variables on bankers’ confidence in their lending recommendation. The results
are shown in Table 4.8.

£
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TABLE 4.8
EFFECT OF DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS
ON BANKERS’ CONFIDENCE
(279 observations)

im

■■■■■

iS i

Interc.

5.81

20.11

0.0001

Parag

-0.15

-1.02

0.30

Exp

-0.004

-0.08

0.93

Acc

-0.01

-0.20

0.84

Audit

0.14

0.90

0.36

Asset

0.02

0.49

0.62

1.10

where:
Parag = The explanatory paragraph
Exp

=

Loan officers’ experience

Acc

=

Loan officers’ accounting education

Audit =

Loan officers’ audit education

Asset =

Bank asset size

a
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These results indicated that none of the explanatory variables was
statistically significant at the .05 level. The null hypothesis that there is no
relationship between the confidence level and the explanatory variables can not
be rejected at the .05 level.
Regression analysis was finally used to investigate the potential impact
of demographics on bankruptcy estimates for this company. The results are
shown in Table 4.9.
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TABLE 4.9
EFFECT OF DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS
ON BANKRUPTCY ESTIMATE
(280 observations)

jjj|jjWj
Interc.

4.11

13.17

0.0001

Parag

0.19

1.19

0.23

Exp

i
O
o

W M l
-1.81

0.07***

Acc

-0.002

-0.04

0.97

Audit

0.16

0.93

0.35

Asset

0.01

0.20

0.84

1.46

*** significant at the .10 level

where:
Parag = The explanatory paragraph
Exp

= Loan officers’ experience

Acc

= Loan officers’ accounting education

Audit

= Loan officers’ audit education

Asset

= Bank asset size

J
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Among the possible explanatory variables, only experience attained
significance at the .10 level. With a negative coefficient, this meant that the
higher the bankers’ experience, the lower their perception of bankruptcy. This
could be attributed to the bankers' previous dealings with companies in similar
financial situation that survived their troubled years.
The next step of the analysis involved investigating the relationship
between the interest rate estimate and bankruptcy perception in both groups.
It would seem plausible that the higher the perception of a company’s
bankruptcy, the higher its risk and therefore, the higher the interest rate that
would be charged to such a company. OLS regression was used to investigate
this relationship where the interest rate estimate was the dependent variable
and bankruptcy perception and the explanatory paragraph were the
independent variables. The results are shown in Table 4.10.

J
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TABLE 4.10
EFFECT OF BANKRUPTCY PERCEPTION
ON THE INTEREST RATE
(above prime rate)
(279 observations)

HHHI
Interc.

1.91

10.84

0.0001

Bankr.

0.15

3.68

0.0003*

Parag.

-0.025

-0.23

0.81

6.77

0.0013*

* significant at the .01 level

where:
Bankr = Estimate of company’s bankruptcy scale
Parag = the explanatory paragraph (1 if received modified report, 0
otherwise)

i
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These results indicated there was a statistically significant relationship
between bankruptcy perception and the interest rate at the .01 level of
significance. The higher the company’s bankruptcy perception, the higher the
interest rate that bankers would charge to this company. The explanatory
paragraph did not have a statistically significant impact on the interest rate.

Nonparametric Tests
The parametric tests employed assumed that the population of bankers
was normally distributed. Nonparametric tests, on the other hand, do not
require such a restrictive assumption. The Kolmogorov-Smimov (KS) twosample test requires only that the samples be randomly selected and be
mutually independent.
The KS test involved determining the maximum absolute difference
between the two-samples cumulative distribution functions. This maximum
difference was then compared to the tabulated difference.
The KS test of the hypothesis of no difference in the lending
recommendation between the two groups showed that the calculated maximum
difference was 0.05. If the significance level was set at 0.10 for a two-tailed
test, the tabulated difference was 0.21. Since the calculated difference was less
than the tabulated difference, the null hypothesis of no difference between the
cumulative distribution functions of the two populations of bankers could not
be rejected at the 0.10 level of significance.

i
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The KS test of the hypothesis of no difference between confidence levels
of both groups of bankers produced a calculated difference of 0.12. If the
significance level was set at 0.10 for a two-tailed test, the tabulated difference
was 0.21. Because the calculated difference was less than the tabulated
difference, the null hypothesis of no difference between the distribution
functions of both populations of bankers in their confidence level could not be
rejected at the 0.10 level of significance.
The KS test of the hypothesis of no difference between both groups in
their bankruptcy estimate produced a calculated difference of 0.07. Setting the
significance level at 0.10 for a two-tailed test, the tabulated difference was 0.21.
Because the calculated difference was less than the tabulated difference, the
null hypothesis of no difference between the two distribution functions of
bankers in their bankruptcy estimate could not be rejected at the 0.10 level of
significance.
Relaxing the assumption of a normally distributed population and
assuming that the Likert scale was an ordinal scale, the non-parametric KS test
failed to reject the first, third and fourth hypotheses set forth in Chapter 2.
The KS test is exact if the measurement scale is continuous and produces
slightly conservative results if the scale is discrete. According to Conover
(1980), this means that the tabulated difference with a discrete scale may be
slightly less than the tabulated difference with a continuous scale. However,
since all calculated values were substantially less than the tabulated values, the

i
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test results would still be valid and the three hypotheses still would not be
rejected.

Summary
This chapter presented the data collection procedures, analysis and
results. It began with a discussion of the purpose and the execution of the pilot
study which was followed by the main study. The possibility of nonresponse
bias was examined by comparing early and late respondents. Next, the chapter
discussed hypotheses tests. Parametric and nonparametric tests were applied to
the data. Each hypothesis was tested to reject it or fail to reject it. The results
showed no difference between the two groups of bankers on any of the scales
or the interest rate estimate. The results also showed that experience positively
affected the interest rate estimate and that bank assets negatively affected the
interest rate estimate. In addition, experience negatively affected the bankers'
perception of this company’s bankruptcy. There was also a statistically
significant positive relationship between interest rate estimate and bankruptcy
estimate for the group receiving the unqualified report and the footnote and a
significant positive relationship between these two estimates for the group
receiving the modified report and the footnote. The following chapter
discusses the study’s conclusions and the policy implications of its findings. It
also notes the limitations and provides suggestions for future research.

t
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CHAPTER 5

DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS
OF FINDINGS

This chapter discusses the research’s findings. It compares these results
to previous empirical results in terms of agreement or disagreement. The
chapter also discusses the implications of these findings on policy making in the
auditing and banking professions. In addition, it notes the limitations of this
research which should be considered when interpreting its results or drawing
conclusions. Finally, it offers possible avenues for future research that would
allow drawing more concrete conclusions on the impact of the going concern
opinion on different users of the financial statements.

Discussion of Findings

This research had several major and secondary objectives. The major
general objective was to investigate the impact of the going concern modified
audit report on credit granting decisions by commercial loan officers. This
general objective was achieved by searching for any information content
attributable to the explanatory paragraph. Information content was determined
to exist if two groups of bankers reached different conclusions about a

105
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particular company based on a modified audit report with an explanatory
paragraph and footnote disclosure of the going concern uncertainty compared
to an unqualified opinion and the footnote disclosure. Bankers had to estimate
the likelihood that a line of credit would be granted, their confidence in this
estimate, the interest rate to charge this company on the line of credit, and
their perception of this company’s bankruptcy status. These estimates and
perceptions served as means of detecting any information content of the
explanatory paragraph.
Secondary objectives of this study included gaining insight into lenders’
reaction to a company exhibiting going concern difficulty. For example, were
demographic characteristics such as experience, accounting and audit education
and bank asset size significant determinants of any of the estimates or
perceptions? These possible determinants could have implications to companies
exhibiting going concern difficulties in their search for a loan. The following
sections discuss the findings.

Likelihood of Granting
Credit

It was hypothesized that the two groups of bankers would make the
same estimate of granting a line of credit for this company regardless of the
method of reporting going concern uncertainty. The results did not support a
rejection of this hypothesis. Therefore, reporting going concern doubt in the
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audit report does not appear to influence bankers’ decision and does not have
statistically significant information content.
This conclusion was reinforced by examining bankers’ reasons for their
estimate (See Appendix C). Among all the factors cited, the most common
factors for both groups were negative working capital, the company’s
dependence on one customer and the company’s earnings history. These
factors were listed in the explanatory paragraph. However, the fact that these
items were noted by the bankers who received only the footnote disclosure
indicates that the going concern footnote provides sufficient explanation of the
going concern problem. For the group receiving the modified report and the
footnote it appeared that of the 141 responses received, only 15 bankers noted
the modified report as a factor in their lending estimate, reinforcing the same
conclusion. In fact, some even wrote "going concern qualification", incorrectly
referring to the modified report, an act that indicated that they did not
perceive the opinion as an unqualified opinion.
These results agreed with the CAR’s (1978) conclusions that restating
footnote information in the audit report was at best redundant and did not
serve a useful purpose. The results also agreed with the ASB’s own logic in
issuing SAS NO. 79 related to other uncertainties. From an academic point of
view, they agreed with the following studies: Estes and Reimer (1977), Libby
(1979b), Abdel-Khalik, Graul and Newton (1986) and Pringle, Crum and Swetz
(1990). However, these results disagreed with Bamber and Stratton (1997) who

*1
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found information content attributable to the modified report due to other
uncertainties and the other studies conducted outside the U.S.
In addition to finding no information content in the explanatory
paragraph, it was noted that the likelihood of granting credit to a going concern
company was low. Based on the Likert scale used in this study, granting a line
of credit was very unlikely. This result agreed with LaSalle and Anandarajan
(1997) who found that bankers were unwilling to consider a loan to companies
with going concern problems.

Interest Rate Estimate
The interest rate estimate also served to measure risk. It was
hypothesized that both groups of bankers would be similar in their interest rate
determination. The results did not support a rejection of this hypothesis. It
was found that bankers assigned the same rate (approximately 2.5% above the
prime rate) to the company regardless of the method of reporting going
concern uncertainty. The explanatory paragraph, therefore, appears to have no
information content. This result agreed with Libby (1979b) and Abdel-Khalik,
Graul and Newton (1986). These studies also did not find an interest rate
difference in loans which bankers would grant to companies based on a
qualified opinion with a footnote and only a footnote disclosure. The results
disagreed with Bamber and Stratton (1997) who found a significant interest
rate difference due to a modified report for other uncertainties. The results
also disagreed with Gul’s (1987) results in Singapore.

k
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Confidence in Lending Estimate
It was hypothesized that bankers’ confidence in a lending estimate would
not differ significantly based on the method of reporting going concern
uncertainty. This hypothesis was designed to measure the quality of the
lending decision. The results did not support a rejection of this hypothesis.
Based on the Likert scale, bankers were on average very confident in their
lending decision. These two estimates, the unlikelihood of making a loan and
their confidence in that decision, taken together reinforced LaSalle and
Anandarajan’s (1997) study that bankers were reluctant to offer credit to a
company with going concern uncertainty. The results also did not reveal
confusion due to the explanatory paragraph in an unqualified opinion as noted
by Pringle, Crum, and Swetz (1990).

Bankruptcy Prediction
It was hypothesized that bankruptcy perception for the same company
would be similar regardless of the reporting method. The results did not
support a rejection of this hypothesis. Both groups of bankers assessed the
same bankruptcy likelihood to this company. Even though the explanatory
paragraph, apparently, did not have information content, other results
appeared. Surprisingly, bankers viewed the likelihood of bankruptcy as
neutral. On a Likert scale, this meant the company was as likely to declare
bankruptcy as to survive. In its recommendation to eliminate the going
concern modification, the CAR (1978) noted that users viewed these
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modifications as prediction of bankruptcy. This study did not find that
particular effect.

Demographic Characteristics
This study found that experience as a loan officer had a significant
positive impact on the interest rate to charge a company exhibiting going
concern difficulty. This finding agreed with Keyes (1978) and Rodgers and
Housel’s (1987) studies that found demographic characteristics to be significant
in the loan decision. In addition, larger banks would have charged a lower
interest rate premium to this company compared to smaller banks. This could
be attributed to larger banks settling for a lower return on their investment
while smaller banks, being more risk averse, would require a larger return on
their investment. Experience also negatively affected bankruptcy estimates,
possibly due to past dealings with similar troubled companies that eventually
survived.

Implications of Findings

This study investigated the information content of the going concern
explanatory paragraph in the modified audit report. The ASB requires the
auditor to positively assess going concern uncertainty in every audit and, if
doubt exists, to add an explanatory paragraph to the audit report. However,
previous research by different committees, as well as academic research, often
has concluded that the information contained in the paragraph is redundant.

i
R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission.

I ll

The current study confirmed these conclusions. When faced with a double
signal regarding going concern uncertainty (explanatory paragraph and
footnote), bankers did not behave differently than when faced with only one
signal in the footnote.
This study’s results should be useful to the ASB in its policy making
efforts. Even though adequate and appropriate disclosure is in the best interest
of all users, redundant information should be avoided. The ASB took the
correct step in eliminating the explanatory paragraph requirement for other
uncertainties and should seriously consider doing the same for going concern
uncertainty.

Limitations of the Study

The conclusions of this study should be interpreted with the following
limitations, that may or may not affect the generalizability of the results. First,
even though the study’s response rate of 13% was adequate for the statistical
tests employed, and nonresponse bias was not detected, the possibility always
exists that nonrespondents could have provided different answers that would
have changed the result. This limitation, however, is common to all surveys.
Second, bankers receiving the modified report and the footnote
disclosure of going concern uncertainty were faced with the standard reporting
practice for this situation, a practice with which they were familiar. However,
the other group received an unqualified audit report with no reference to going
concern uncertainty and a footnote disclosure, a reporting practice with which

i
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they were not familiar. The artificial nature of this situation should be taken
into consideration in interpreting the results.
Finally, the study’s conclusions may or may not be generalized to other
companies exhibiting going concern uncertainty. Care was taken to choose a
company exhibiting borderline going concern characteristics to avoid extreme
answers. Based on respondents’ bankruptcy estimate, this proved to be true.
However, bankers’ reaction to other companies with more or less severe going
concern characteristics may be different.

Suggestions for Future Research

Reporting going concern difficulty has been a controversial issue for the
ASB, auditors and users. This study investigated bankers’ reaction to the
current method of reporting compared to a method not currently used. Future
research could address two important issues. First, it should investigate other
users’ (such as bondholders, stockholders and financial analysts) reaction to the
going concern explanatory paragraph. If the same results were found, it would
strengthen the argument of eliminating the going concern modification in the
audit report. Second, since SAS No. 59 was issued in 1988, it is important to
measure users’ preference for the method of reporting going concern
uncertainty ten years later. Therefore, a descriptive study could be conducted,
especially since the report modification requirement for other uncertainties was
eliminated by the issuance of SAS No. 79 in 1995.
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CASE STUDY AND QUESTIONNAIRE
(Audit report contains the explanatoiy paragraph)
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The leading decision is a continuing concern for members of the
banking community, the accounting profession, and academia. Questions have
arisen concerning the amount and type of information communicated to users
of the financial statements, especially bankers.
I am a doctoral candidate in accounting at Louisiana Tech University
and am conducting a study to determine a company’s risk profile in a lending
decision. This risk will be measured based on loan officers’ reaction to
selected information included in this company’s annual report.
You have probably been asked in the past to participate in studies
concerning corporate financial reporting. These requests can become
burdensome; yet only through the help of experts like yourself can the quality
of this information be improved. If you feel that somebody else in your bank
may be more interested in completing this survey, please forward it to him /her.
Please find enclosed selected information from a company’s annual
report to use in a lending decision. Obviously, corporate lending decisions are
based on a great deal of information beyond that provided here for this
company. However, it was necessary that the information package be limited
to that enclosed due to your time constraints. May I ask 10-20 minutes of your
time to review the enclosed information and answer a few questions? You can
be assured of complete confidentiality. Your bank’s name will never be placed
on the research instrument nor will any respondent be individually identified.
Your help will be sincerely appreciated and will hopefully contribute to
improvements in financial reporting.
Sincerely,

Rafik Z. Elias
DBA Candidate in Accounting

I
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The data provided consists of:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

Information about the company and its business
A n audit report
Condensed financial statements
3 Footnotes

After reading this information, the questions will ask you to predict the
likelihood that this company will be granted a one-year secured working capital
line of credit in the range of $750,000 - $1 million and the appropriate interest
rate.

DESCRIPTION OF BUSINESS

Started in 1976, ABC, Inc. is engaged through its wholly owned
subsidiary, Sub., Inc. in manufacturing and distributing cosmetics and other
beauty products and providing facial and other beauty services. Products and
services are sold in better department stores and specialty stores in the U.S.
and Canada. In 1995, Sub., began selling specialty cosmetic products through
television marketing.

OTHER INFORMATION

Number of outstanding shares: 11,612,926
Shares held by officers and directors: 8,188,935 (70% of total)
Number of shareholders: 2,519
Close(or average) price for the stock: $1,375
Exchange: American Stock Exchange
M arket value(OOOs): $15,909
Annual dividends: 0
Number of employees: 118
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3-YEAR FINANCIAL SUMMARY(OOO'S)
July 31,1996 July 31,1995

July 31,1994

Cash
Receivables
Inventories
Other Current Assets
TOTAL CURRENT ASSETS
Property, Plant & Equipment
Accumulated Depredation
Net Property, Plant & Equipment
Intangibles
Deposits & Other Assets
TOTAL ASSETS
Accounts Payable
Current Long-Term Debt
Accrued Expenses
TOTAL CURRENT LIABILITIES
Long-Term Debt
Other Long-Term Liabilities
TOTAL LIABILITIES
Common StockfNet)
Preferred Stock
Capital Surplus
Retained Earnings
TOTAL STOCKHOLDERS’ EQUITY
TOTAL LIABILITIES & EQUITY

8,618
115
750
12,630
(11.357)
2.138
10.756

11,589
114
750
12,522
(1Z613)
774
12,36?

1,134
1,444
3,766
268
6,611
8,182
4,342
3,840
3,965
198
14.615
3,343
7.641
2,461
13,445
149
120
13,714
103
750
11,234
(11.186)
901
14.615

Net Sales
Cost Of Goods Sold
GROSS PROFIT
Selling, General &Administrative Expenses
OPERATING INCOMEfLOSS)
Interest Expenses
Other Expenses
Income Before Taxes
NET INCOMEfLOSS)
Shares Outstanding

32,151
9,292
22,859
20,899
1,960
440
21
1,499
1.365
11,519

29,358
7,651
21,707
22,631
(924)
461
42
(1.427)
(1.427)
11,403

34,764
13,035
21,729
29,284
(7,554)
1,508
677
(6,723)
L«,723)
10,272

1,365
1,491
(174)
192
2,874
(387)

(1,427)
1,136
69
212
(10)
(193)

(387)
(1.981)

(193)
(1.957)

(6.722)
1,001
5,829
(1.754)
(1.646)
(81)
1799
1,718
(2.327)
3,300

(1.981)
506

1,036
(921)
11.1241

Net Income
Depredation/Amortization
Net Increase/Decrease Assets/Liabilities
Other AdjustmentsfNet)
NET CASH PROVIDED(USED) BY OPERATING ACT1V
Net lncrease(Deaease) in Property, Plant & Equipment
Acquisrtion(disposib'on) of subs, business
NET CASH PROVfDED(USED) BY INVESTING ACTIVt
lncrease(Decrease) in Borrowings
tssue(Purchasa) of Equity
Other Cash Inflow
NET CASH PROVIDED(USED) BY FINANCING ACTIVt
NET CHANGE IN CASH AND CASH EQUIVALENTS

516
1,392
3,327
29
5,264
7,351
5,622
1,729
3,625
138
10,756
3,106 .
2,863
1,924
7,893
725

10
2,689
2,553
282
5,535
7,949
5,093
2,856
3,795
176
12.362
3,789
5.421
2,230
11,440
149
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AUDIT REPORT BY A "BIG SIX" FIRM
We have audited the accompanying consolidated balance sheets of ABC,
Inc.(a New York corporation) and subsidiaries as of July 31, 1996 and 1995,
and the related consolidated statements of operations, shareholders’ equity and
cash flows for each of the three years in the period ended July 31, 1996. These
financial statements are the responsibility of the company’s management. Our
responsibility is to express an opinion on these financial statements based on
our audits.
We conducted our audits in accordance with generally accepted auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to
obtain reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements are free of
material misstatement. An audit includes examining, on a test basis, evidence
supporting the amounts and disclosures in the financial statements. An audit
also includes assessing the accounting principles used and significant estimates
made my management, as well as evaluating the overall financial statement
presentation. We believe that our audits provide a reasonable basis for our
opinion.
In our opinion, the financial statements referred to above present fairly,
in all material respects the financial position of ABC, Inc. and subsidiaries as
of July 31, 1996 and 1995, and the results of their operations and their cash
flows for each of the three years in the period ended July 31, 1996, in
conformity with generally accepted accounting principles.
The accompanying financial statements have been prepared assuming
that the company will continue as a going concern. As discussed in Note 3 to
the financial statements, the fiscal year ended July 31, 1996 is the first
profitable year of operations in five years; however, the company maintains a
working capital deficit at July 31, 1996 and is significantly dependent upon one
customer. These factors discussed in Note 3 raise substantial doubt about the
company’s ability to continue as a going concern. Management’s plans in regard
to these matters are also described in Note 3. The financial statements do not
include any adjustments that might result from the outcome of this uncertainty.
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FOOTNOTES TO THE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS

NOTE 1: SIGNIFICANT ACCOUNTING POLICIES:
All significant intercompany transactions and accounts have been
eliminated in consolidation. Inventories are stated at the lower of cost or
market. Cost is determined using the first-in, first-out method. Property, plant
and equipment are stated at cost and depreciated using the straight-line
method over their estimated useful lives ranging from 4 to 15 years.

NOTE 2: DEBTS OUTSTANDING:
LONG-TERM DEBT:
1996

1995

Term promissory note
(please see (1) below)

$1,025,000

$1,325,000

Term loan
(please see (2) below)

2,500,00

3,741,233

Related party loans

34,826

300,000

Notes payable(construction)

28,019

202,993

3,587,845
(2,862,845)

5,569,226
(5,420,644)

725,000

148,582

Less, current portion

Long-term notes payable

(1) Note is collaterized by a distribution and administration facility. Interest is
2% above the bank’s prime lending rate(8.75% and 7.25% at July 31, 1996 and
1995 respectively). Principal payments of $25,000 are due each month until
Dec. 1999.
(2) Interest is .5% above the bank’s prime lending rate. Financial covenants at
July 31, 1996 require the company to have consolidated tangible net worth of
not less than $2,250,000 and capital expenditures not to exceed $400,000. The
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company was in compliance. For the year ending July 31, 1997, consolidated
net worth should be no less than $1 million.

NOTE 3; GOING CONCERN;

During the fiscal year ended July 31, 1996, the company began to realize
the results of its restructuring efforts which have been occurring over the last
three fiscal years. Over this period of time, the company reduced staff levels,
implemented cost reduction programs and was successful in restructuring its
debt facilities into longer more manageable terms. These factors combined with
the success of the sales of Sub. products through the Home Shopping
Network(HSN) has resulted in the company recording profits of $1,364,646 for
the fiscal year ended July 31, 1996. This is the first profitable year for the
company since the fiscal year ended July 1990. However, the company still
maintains negative working capital of $2,629,154 and is currently significantly
dependent upon one customer, and must meet a tangible net worth covenant of
$1 million by July 31, 1997. During the fiscal year ended July 31, 1996 HSN
was responsible for 48% of net sales. The prior years’ losses combined with the
demands of reducing large debt levels limited the company’s ability to provide
inventory to its customers, in adequate supply, on a consistent basis.
The current year’s profitability and positive cash flow from operations
have enabled the company to minimize its out-of-stock inventory situation.
During the latter part of fiscal year 1996, the company also decided to suspend
its distribution of fragrance products. The company can now concentrate its
efforts and available cash flow toward attaining inventory levels in the skin care
and cosmetic products distributed by Sub. which are more closely matched with
manufacturing lead times and customer demands. During fiscal 1997, the
company plans to invest in the refixturing and updating of its facial salons and
counters at department store locations. The fiscal 1996 selling, general and
administrative expenses include a $500,000 charge which reflects the
acceleration of depreciation on older outdated salon equipment, furniture and
fixtures. There has been increased interest in the Sub. product line due to the
success of the sale of products through HSN. In addition to being able to
provide the customer with a full line of skin care products, the company wants
to maintain and enhance its image as a provider of quality skin care services.
The company is seeking a buyer for the Y Trademark and investigating
opportunities to sell and distribute the Sub. product line outside of its current
U.S. and Canadian markets.
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QUESTIONNAIRE

Please answer the following questions. Your help is greatly appreciated.
Assume that this company is a new customer applying to your bank for a oneyear working capital line of credit in the range of $750,000 - $1 million. It will
be secured by the company’s accounts receivable and inventory.

1. Based on the information presented in this case, please estimate the
likelihood, on a scale of 1 to 7, that this line of credit will be granted, (circle
one)
1------ 2------ 3-------4------ 5-------6
(highly
unlikely)

-7
(highly
likely)

2. What were the major factors influencing the decision relative to the granting
of this line of credit?

3. On a scale of 1 to 7, please indicate your level of confidence in your
previous estimate.(circle one)
1------ 2----- -3-------4------ 5
(minimum
confidence)

6-------7
(maximum
confidence)

3. Regardless of the previous answers, please indicate your best estimate of the
interest rate to charge this company on this line of credit, assuming that your
bank uses the Wall Street Journal published prime rate and that it is currently
8.25%
8.25% +

%
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4. On a scale of 1 to 7, please indicate your best estimate that this company
will be bankrupt in the next 12 months, (circle one)
1------ 2------ 3------- 4------ 5-------6-------7
(highly
(highly
unlikely)
likely)

5. Approximately, how many years of lending experience do you
have?(including experience in reviewing loan applications) (check one)
less than 5

5-10

16-20

more than 20

11-15

6. Approximately, how many university-level accounting courses have you
taken?(check one)
less than 2
6-7

2-3

4-5

more than 7

7. Have you had at least one auditing course?

Yes

No

8. Please indicate the appropriate range of your bank’s assets:
__________$100 - $299.9 Million
$300 - $499.9 Million
__________$500 - $999.9 Million
__________$ 1 - 4 . 9 Billion
__________$5 Billion Pius
9. Please write today’s date

Please detach the two pages containing the questions and mail them back in
the enclosed envelope. If you would like to receive a copy of this study’s results,
please enclose your name and address on a separate sheet of paper or a
business card in the envelope.
Thank you very much for your cooperation.
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CASE STUDY AND QUESTIONNAIRE SAME AS APPENDIX A
(Audit report without the explanatory paragraph)
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AUDIT REPORT BY A "BIG SIX" FIRM

We have audited the accompanying consolidated balance sheets of ABC,
Inc.(a New York corporation) and subsidiaries as of July 31, 1996 and 1995,
and the related consolidated statements of operations, shareholders’ equity and
cash flows for each of the three years in the period ended July 31, 1996. These
financial statements are the responsibility of the company’s management. Our
responsibility is to express an opinion on these financial statements based on
our audits.
We conducted our audits in accordance with generally accepted auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to
obtain reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements are free of
material misstatement. An audit includes examining, on a test basis, evidence
supporting the amounts and disclosures in the financial statements. An audit
also includes assessing the accounting principles used and significant estimates
made my management, as well as evaluating the overall financial statement
presentation. We believe that our audits provide a reasonable basis for our
opinion.
In our opinion, the financial statements referred to above present fairly,
in all material respects the financial position of ABC, Inc. and subsidiaries as
of July 31, 1996 and 1995, and the results of their operations and their cash
flows for each of the three years in the period ended July 31, 1996, in
conformity with generally accepted accounting principles.
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SAMPLE OF RESPONDENTS’ COMMENTS

R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission.

RESPONSES FROM THE GROUP RECEIVING THE MODIFIED
REPORT AND THE FOOTNOTE DISCLOSURE

Positive Factors
1. Profitable operations this year
2. New avenues for growth-Television Marketing
3. Focusing on best product seller

Negative Factors
1. Poor earnings performance
2. Highly leveraged
3. Undercapitalized
4. Dependent on one customer
5. Going concern qualification
6. Only one year of profitability
7. Negative working capital
8. Need to see results of other changes in operations
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RESPONSES FROM THE GROUP RECEIVING
ONLY THE FOOTNOTE DISCLOSURE

Positive Factors
1. Current liabilities and total liabilities are decreasing
2. Gross profit and net income are increasing
3. Steps are being taken to turn the company around and improve financial
health
Negative Factors
1. Only one year of profitability
2. Weak liquidity
3. Collateral is inventory dependent
4. Sales dependent on one customer
5. Negative net worth
6. Highly leveraged
7. High operating expenses(mismanagement)
8. Negative cash flows after debt amortization
9. High intangible assets
10. Unstable market, likelihood of low quality accounts receivable
11. Negative working capital
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